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In general, taxes and transfer payments change automatically over 
the business cycle so as to reduce the magnitude of the fluctuations 
in national income. As income increases during the expansion, taxes 
increase and transfer payments decrease, thereby moderating the in-
creases in consumption and as income decreases during contractions, 
taxes decrease and transfer payments increase; these changes act to 
reduce the magnitude of the decreases in consumption and investment. 
Taxes and transfer payments which change in response to changes in 
income are called automatic fiscal stabilizers because they change 
automatically and serve to stabilize the economy. 
The eff~ctiveness of the automatic stabilizers is usually measured 
in terms of the degree to which they moderate fluctuations in the level 
of national income. From a policy point of view it is: very important 
to know the degree of effectiveness of existing automatic stabilizers. 
Any corrective action during economic expansions or contractions with~ 
out the knowledge of the effectiveness of these stabilizers may prove 
futile. 
Serious attempts to measure the effectiveness of automatic stabi-
1 izers have been made only since 1948 although their importance had 
long been recognized. The empirical evidence indicates in general, 
that the stabilizers have made a substantial contribution to the stabi-
2 
lity of the economy. Previous empirical studies have dealt with the 
periods of business cycle (expansions and contractions) when, in gen-
eral, output and price level were moving in the same direction. There 
has not been a recent study on this subject. Moreover, it is interest-
ing to examine the role of automatic stabilizers during periods of in-
flation and stagflation. ,This study will concern itself with such per-
l 
iods. Moreover, the stabilizers will be examined from the point of view 
of both output and price stabilization. 
The Nature of the Problem 
Not only that there has been no recent study on this subject but 
the role of automatic stabilizers during periods of inflation and 
stagflation has not yet been explored. For example, the periods of 
economic expansions studied earlier were such when considerable in-
crease in output occurred along with some increase in the price level. 
Therefore, the effect of automatic stabilizers on the economy during 
inflation when considerable amount of the increase in income is due 
to the rising prices, has not been known so far. 
The economic expansion of the sixties had actually two phases. 
Phase I, from 1961 through 1965, was characterized by growth in real 
output and stable prices. Phase II, from 1966 through 1969, had con~ 
siderable increase in income in the form of rapidly rising prices. The 
economy was at full employment at the beginning of 1966. Unemployment 
rate fell below four percent to its lowest level since 1953 (53). In 
other words, the later (1966 I - 1969 III) part of the expansion was 
more of a period of inflation. The following recession of 1969-70 was 
characterized by falling output and rising prices. Of the periods being 
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studied, it was only during the expansion of 1970 IV - 1973 IV that 
considerable rise in output was achieved. Then came the worst reces-
sion of the postwar period (1973 IV - 1975 I) when, once again, falling 
output was accompanied by a rising price level. These periods provide 
an opportunity to re-investigate the effectiveness of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers and, in particular, to examine their effectiveness when 
output and the price level are moving in opposite directions. 
During such economic recessions when output is falling but the 
price level is rising to the extent that an actual fall in output will 
be showing a rise in nominal income, automatic fiscal policy is faced 
with a dilemma. Taxes should fall and transfer payments rise in the 
wake of declining incomes but this· will serve to put additional upward 
pressure on the price level. Therefore, it becomes important to examine 
both the output and price stabilization aspects of the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. 
The Purpose of the Study / 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness 
of automatic fiscal stabilizers during periods of inflation and stag-
.-··--~~-~.-~---·--... -·-----~,----............. , .............. ,.-........ - ... , . ..-........... ,.. ....... ~,, . ., ..... _._ .... -,,. ... ..,.~--~-.-'Yo·---......... " ............... ,~.,,,pr,,., ... -.. ....... ,.,,,..,,.....,, ... ,, ........ ....,,."'._ ....... ~.,-~ ... ~"'---......_ _ ........ __ ... ,_.~. 
flation with special emphasis on thei~f.qrma~xp.u.t._.an.d_Qr.i.£.e......, ,_____________________ --~--- i 
stabilizers. It is hypothesized that the automatic fiscal stabilizers ...--·~....--·M•---~ 
are more effective during a more or less pure inflationary situation 
and less effective during stagflation. This hypothesis will be tested 
applying the actual data. 
Significance of the Study 
This study wi 11 examine the periiod starting from the first quarter 
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of 1966 to the first quarter of 1975 which is divided into the follow-
ing four sub-periods: 
i) 1966 I - 1969 III expansion 
ii) 1969 III - 1970 IV recession 
iii) 1970 IV - 1973 IV expansion 
iv} 1973 IV - 1975 I recession2 (52} 
' The significance of the present study is that it will cover the periods that have not been examined before and have special character-
istics not associated with the previous expansions and recessions stud-
ied so far. Furthermore, this study would enable us to know whether 
the stabilizers move in the direction of stabilizing both output and 
prices. Previous studies were primarily concerned with income stabili-· 
zation and have implicitly assumed that the price level was constant 
or that changes in the price level did not matter. During the period 
under investigation, the price level did change significantly. In fact, 
the increas~ in the price level was so great that nominal national 
income increased during 1969-70 and 1973-75 despite the reduction in 
real national income which occurred during those periods. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is divided into seven chapters. This chapter includes an; 
introduction and discussion of the nature of the problem and its 
significance. Chapter II deals with the concept of automatic stabi-
1 izers. Some of the important definitions of automatic stabilizers and 
the one developed for the purpose of this study are noted .. A brief· 
discussion about the distinction between fiscal and monetary stabili-
zers is also included. This chapter also discusses the output and price 
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stabilizers. Finally, the automatic stabilizers examined in this study 
are specified. 
Chapter III is concerned with the review of some of the previous 
studies of automatic stabilizers. Methodology used in· the present study 
is given in Chapter IV. Chapter Vis devoted to the derivation, adju~t­
ment and classification of the data. Analysis of the data and the 
results are reported in Chapter VI. The last chapter contains summary 
and conclusions of the study. 
FOOTNOTES 
1secause the automatic stabilizers reduce the nation's growth 
rate during expansions, they may or may not be desirable. The effect 
of the automatic stabilizers on the economy during expansions is 
called fiscal drag. 
2The business cycle (reference) peaks and troughs are those 
designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research except in the 
case of 1966-69 expansion where third quarter of 1969 is used as a 
peak instead of fourth quarter used by the NBER. Output in the 
fourth quarter 1969 was actually smaller than that of the previous 
quarter. For the purpose of this study, a rise or fall in real national 
income is important because it triggers a corresponding rise or fall 
in tax payments. Therefore, the third quarter is used as the peak. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS 
Introduction 
Systematic study of the stabilizers' automatic response goes back 
to R. F. Bretherton (5) who wrote in 1937 11 The subject of sensitivity 
of the yield of various types of taxes to the movement of the trade 
cycle is of great practical importance; but it has been almost complete-
ly overlooked in the standard English works on Public Finance. 11 How-
ever, the concept of automatic stabilizers has drawn considerable atten-
tion only after the works of Committee for Economic Development (11), 
Milton Friedman (20), A. G. Hart (23) and R. A. Musgrave and M. H. 
Miller (35). The concept is now well established in the economic arena 
and various studies have revealed that the stabilizers have made sub-
stantial contribution to the stability of the economy. Nevertheless, 
economists differ in the matter of their definition and as to what 
exactly constitutes an automatic stabilizer. Distinction is also made 
between fiscal stabilizers and monetary stabilizers. This chapter will 
be devoted to the discussion of these matters. Moreover, the question 
of output and price stabilizers will also be examined. 
Automatic Stabilizers Defined 
There is no commonly agreed upon definition of automatic stabili-
zers. W. P. Egle (13) offers the following criteria for an automatic 
7 
stabilizer: 
(1) Permanently installed, (2) well defined in its main 
provisions and purposes, and (3) reliably linked to cycli-
cally sensitive criteria (indexes) in the sense that the 
device starts to operate counter-cyclically as soon as these 
criteria indicate the need for action (p. 46). 
Hart (23)(24) sets up the following requirements for automatic 
stabilizers in the 1st and 2nd editions of his book: 
(1) Does it push the government's budget toward deficit in 
case of a slump and toward surplus as business improves? 
(2) Does it expand the public's stock of cash in a slump 
and reduce it in high prosperity? (3) Does it tend to re-
duce the public's demand for cash in a slump and increase it 
in high prosperity? (4) Does it ao into action without wait-
ing for fresh policy decisions? (p. 475, 462). 
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However, in their third edition, A. G. Hart and P. B. Kennen (25 )(26) 
drop the second and third requirement retaining only the first and the 
last one, which simply means automatic stabilizers are budget items 
or programs that push the budget toward a surplus or deficit during 
expansion or recession respectively without waiting for discretionary 
changes in the various tax laws. 
Describing Hart's above mentioned four requirements for an auto-
matic stabilizer as the minimum conditions, M. 0. Clement ( 8) has 
suggested two additional tests . 
. . . one of the additional requisites of an efficacious 
automatic countercyclical program is that the devices must 
have enough permanence to become part of the economic milieu 
of decision~making units (p. 306) . 
. . . the finaJ requirement of effective built-in stabilizers 
is that they be closely tied to operational variables that 
are sensitive to and conform with economic fluctuations (p. 309). 
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Wilfred Lewis, Jr. (31) defines built-in fiscal stabilizers as: 
... those federal receipts and expenditures which, in response 
to contraction, operate in the direction of increasing the fed-
eral deficit, or decreasin9 the surplus, without the need for 
policy decision or action lp. 26). 
Definition 
i Automatic fiscal stabilizers can thus be defined as those budget 
components that are permanently ins ta 11 ed, that in response to a reces-
sion or expansion change direction automatically without waiting for 
new legislation, and reduce the change in national income relative to 
what it would be in the absence of such stabilizing devices. 
Automatic Monetary Stabilizers 
As pointed out by E. Cary Brown (6) monetary stabilizers are also 
present and may as well be important. In order to see how they would 
come into operation, let us assume money supply is held constant. Any 
change in money output will bring about a corresponding change in the 
transactions' demand for money and interest rates will tend to respond 
similarly. This in turn, will affect investment, government spending 
and consumption to the extent these variables are sensitive to changes 
in the interest rate, thereby bringing in some offsetting changes in 
real demand. Also, in a situation where money stock'is constant and 
prices are allowed to vary, real wealth will change. In times of rising 
prices, real wealth will decline which will induce a decline in rates 
of spending. A reduction in price level will bring about the opposite 
results. Yet, another way monetary stabilizer could work is when change 
i 
in the stock of money is equated with the budget surpluses or deficits. 
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In this way budget deficits will increase the stock of money while 
surpluses will decrease it, _tberepy starting an automatic operation in 
an offsetting way. 
While the above mentioned stabilizers are potentially present 
and could probably be activated, they cannot be called automatic in 
the strictest sense. Monetary authorities will have to decide to 
hold the money supply constant or to equate the change in the stock 
of money with budget surpluses or deficits. There is no law existing 
at present which provides for such arrangements to become effective 
automatically when the need arises. In other words, a great deal of 
discretionary action is involved. Moreover, the contention that wealth 
effect would bring about changes in real demand in an offsetting man-
ner is subject to dispute. For one thing, prices may be rigid down-
ward. But even if prices are flexible both ways, wealth effect may not 
be strong enough to start off the desired movement in real demand. 
Variations in the supply of moneyness or liquidity demand may 
also influence the level of national income. Of course, such an 
influence will not have as direct an impact on national income as 
government budget deficits and surpluses. But any change in money 
supply will only start showing its effect on effective demand after 
peoples' desire for liquidity has been fulfilled. It could very well 
be that a small variation in money supply is absorbed in adjusting 
to the desired liquidity positions (8 ). 
While this study will be limited to the examination of fiscal sta-
bilizers only it should not be implied that the monetary aspects of 
automatic countersyclical devices is not recognized. 
11 
Output and Price Stabilizers 
Previous studies of the automatic stabilizers seem to have income 
stabilization as their only relevant goal. This motivation may partly 
be attributed to the fact that generally prices and output moved in 
the same direction during those earlier expansions and that prices 
were at least not rising during contractions. But the periods coverep 
in the present study are such that we cannot afford to ignore the 
distinction between output and price stabilizers. These periods 
strengthen the need to examine the stabilizers both from the point of 
view of output and price stabilization. The two recessions included 
in the present st~dy, 1969 III - 1970 IV and 1973 IV - 1975 I, specially 
the latter one, were characterized by declining output and rising 
prices. Moreover, as pointed out by Brown (6), income is the product 
of quantity and prices, the change in income may be reflecting either 
the change in output or prices or both. Therefore, automatic stabili-
zers may be examined from the point of view of both output as well 
as price stabilizer. It should also be noted here that the sensitivity 
of the tax revenue in response to business fluctuations depends more 
on the effective than the statutory tax rates. Effective tax rate is 
the one which affects the income elasticity of taxes. A change in the 
general price.level and a process of economic growth may change effec-
tive tax rates due to the distributional change in individual income 
or corporate income or change in spending on those goods and services 
that are subject to excise taxes (48). This further signifies the role 




Since income is the product of both quantity and prices, in order 
to evaluate the stabilization from the point of view of any one of the 
two elements, the other has to be kept out of the picture. For the 
determination of output stabilization, we assume that prices are inde-
pendent of output changes or that they are constant. Any automatic ; 
change in the demand for output would bring about changes in the output 
via the multiplier principle. For example, an increase in business 
investment, in government expenditure or in private consumption would 
result into a multiple increase in output depending of course, on the 
size of the multiplier. A decrease in one or all of the above vari-
ables would bring about the opposite results. Now, let us assume that 
there are two fiscal structures, one without and the other with auto-
matic stabilizers. In other words, in the system without automatic 
stabilizers, taxes and transfer payments are fixed and do not change 
with a change in income, while in the structure with automatic stabi-
1 izers, tax revenues and transfer payments do vary with the variation 
in income. Following an autonomous change in one or all of the above 
mentioned variables, fluctuations in income would be dampened in the 
latter system because of the operation of automatic stabilizers. An . 
output stabilizer would tend to expand or reduce aggregate spending on 
goods and services compared to what would be spent in the system with 
no automatic stabilizers. In other words, the operation of automatic 
stabilizers will reduce the size of the multiplier thereby reducing the 
fluctuations in output. Let us take the case of a drop in private in-
vestment. This will result into a drop in income. It will reduce the 
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tax liability first, by reducing the tax base in response to a drop in 
income, and second, by reducing the tax yield in response to a reduction 
in the tax base. After tax incomes will therefore, drop by less than 
if there was no decline in tax liability which will cushion the decline 
in consumption. As a net result income will not fall by as much as 
would have been the case had there been no automatic stabilizers operat-
1 ing. Following the same logic, a decline in income will increase unem-
ployment benefit payments thus help stabilize the national income by 
checking the drop in disposable income and hence consumption. 
Prtce Stabilizers 
As far back as in 1955, Cary Brown (6) emphasized the need for 
examining a stabilizer both from the point of view of output as well 
as price stabilizer. Later on, D. A. L. Auld (2) also recognized this 
point. But so far no empirical work seems to have been done as far as 
price stabilizers are concerned. A particular fiscal tool may be 
operating so as to stabilize output but at the same time it may be 
working as a destabilizer with regard t~ price changes and vice versa. 
Following the logic in the previous section, let us assume output 
is constant. In other words, all the change in national'income is on 
the price side only. Now, we assume two fiscal structures, one without 
and the other with a~tomatic price stabilizers. An autonomous shift 
in aggregate demand, either iRitiated by a change in business investment, 
government expenditure or consumption expenditure, will bring about 
necessary change in money income via the multiplier principle. The 
change in money income in the system with automatic price stabilizers 
will be relatively small beca~se part of it would be offset by the in-
duced changes in these stabilizers. An autonomous rise in aggregate 
demand will increase money incomes. People will be moved into the 
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higher income brackets and subject to higher marginal taxes due to the 
progressive rate structure .. Moreover, since exemptions and deductions 
are fixed in nominal terms they will decline in real value which will 
also increase the income subject to tax. All this will increase tax 
j 
liabilities and because of this accompanying rise in tax liabilities! 
disposable incomes of the people will not rise by as much as it would 
have been the case had there been no automatic stabilizers. This, in 
turn, will dampen further increases in money income. In a situation 
where there is no increase in output and all increases in income are 
due to pure inflation, an automatic price stabilizer must operate in 
such a way that the elasticity of money taxes with respect to income 
changes is greater than one. This condition is necessary to slow down 
the rate of inflation (6)(2). It follows then, that a unitary elasti-
city of money taxes with respect to income would neither accelerate 
nor decelerate the rate of inflation or to put it differently, would 
at least help stop the inflation from getting worse. In a sense, uni-
tary income elasticity of taxes is also keeping down the rate of in-
flation which would have been greater had the taxes not risen propor-
tionately with income. 
As pointed out by Auld (2), in a more realistic case when an infla-
tionary situation incorporates some real increase in output, automatic 
stabilizers have to operate in such a way that real taxes are increased, 
that is, elasticity of money taxes with respect to prices exceeds one. 
However, we feel that even if an automatic stabilizer cannot reverse 
the direction of a change in prices all by itself any responsiveness 
of money taxes and transfer payments in the right direction may be 
considered a contributing factor to the overall stabilization process 
because prices would definitely have been higher in the absence of 
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such devices. This could be achieved as long as the elasticity of money 
taxes with respect to income is positive. 
Automatic Stabilizers in Existence 
Included in the present study are the following major automatic 
stabilizers: Individual income tax, corporate income tax, excise tax, 
payroll taxes i.e., old-age and survivors insurance taxes, old-age 
and survivors insurance benefit payments, unemployment contributions 
and unemployment compensation benefit payments. 
These stabilizers may be grouped into direct and indirect stabi-
lizers as far as their effect on disposable income is concerned. Indi-
vidual income tax, payroll taxes on employees, OASDI benefit payments, 
unemployment compensation payments may be called direct stabilizers 
while the corporate income tax, payroll taxes on employers, unemploy-
ment contributions and excise taxes as indirect stabilizers. 
During a recession a drop in individual income taxes as a result 
of a decline in incomes would have cushioning effect directly on 
i disposable income in that it would prevent the latter from falling as' 
much as earned national income. But a decline in corporate taxes after 
a drop in corporate profits will effect disposable income only indirect-
ly via corporations' change in dividend payments and employment poli-
cies (31 ). Unemployment benefit payments rise when employment drops 
during recessions thereby keeping di sposab 1 e income from fa 11 i ng to the 
full extent of the drop in wages and salaries. Employers' contributions 
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to the state unemployment insurance fund are reduced during a downturn 
thus affecting corporations' output and employment decisions. Old-age 
and survivors insurance contributions are based on payrolls. They will 
decline during a contraction and would therefore, be a direct support 
to the disposable income. OASDI benefits are not dependent upon the 
overall business situation but are treated as stabilizers because busi-
ness conditions may be influencing the retirement decisions of elderly 
workers who may for example, hasten their retirement in a recession (25). 
These benefit payments would be expected to rise during a downturn. 
During an upturn, individual income tax and employees share of 
OASDI contributions would rise while OASDI benefit payments and unem-
ployment compensation payments would fall checking the rise in dispo-
sable income of the individuals. Similarly, corporate income taxes, 
employers' share of OASDI contributions, unemployment contributions and 
excise taxes would rise with the rise in business activity and serve 
as a drag on expansion. It is also important to keep in mind that 
besides the cyclical volatility of the base, the existing structure 
of progressive income tax rates provides an added feature to the auto-
matic stability of this tax. As the economy expands, individuals are 
moved up on the ladder into higher income brackets and are subject to 
higher marginal tax rates. On the other hand, lower tax rates are 
applicable as individuals' fall back to lower income brackets. during 
a recession. Moreover, exemptions and deductions are set in nominal 
terms. They are reduced in real terms during expansions hence raising 
the taxable income of individuals which raises the tax liabilities. 
One may be tempted to include Federal Farm Price Support Program, 
Food Stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the 
17 
list of automatic stabilizers because payments under these programs 
may vary countercyclically. For the purposes of this study however, 
they are not included in the current battery of automatic stabilizers 
for the reasons explained below. Nevertheless, it would be worth dis-
cussing these programs briefly. 
Farm Price Support Program 
Federal government makes subsidy payments to farmers for their 
products under the so called parity formula whenever the prices of 
non-farm products rise vis-a-vis farm products. Such payments are 
said to rise during recessions as prices of farm products are depressed 
relative to non-farm products. But this may not be the case. Prices 
of agricultural commodities may be falling during an expansion due to 
a boom in production. This will increase farm subsidies whereas we 
would like them to decrease from the point of view of stability. 
Similarly, bad crops due to unusual weather conditions etc. may cause 
a sharp decline in output and a rise in farm prices during recessions 
which will decline support payments at a time when they should rise 
to have a stabilizing effect. Demand considerations may not weigh 
heavier in the determinants of prices of farm products because the de-
mand for food has little income elasticity in the short run. Even 
if support payments rise say, in a recession they may not have the 
influence strong enough to increase total demand. Such payments are 
limited only within the farm sector. Additional purchasing power made 
available to the farm fam~lies may be offset by the diversion of pur-
chasing power of consumers away from non-farm goods (19 )(31). A sum 
of $1 ,345 million were spent on price support and related programs during 
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fiscal year 1966 (60). Such payments amounted to $575 million during 
fiscal year 1975 (61). Moreover, price support program is not as rigid 
as it used to be. Administration is now allowed not only to alter 
the support levels within a range, but also calculate parity prices on 
a more flexible basis (8). This brings in a discretionary element in 
the farm price support program and therefore, jeopardizes its candidacy 
as a built-in stabilizer. 
Food Stamp Program 
Although a number of pilot food stamp projects were established 
in 1961, the food stamp program as we see it today, only came into 
being after the promulgation of Food Stamp Act of 1964 and its subse-
quent amendments. The objective is to provide assistance to eligible 
households in purchasing food through normal marketing channels in 
order to raise the level bf/nutrition of low income people and to 
strengthen agricultural economy through a beneficial distribution of 
abundant food supplies. The eligibility criteria is based more on the 
basis of need rather than categorical limitations so that the working 
poor could also benefit from the program. This is one of the major 
income maintenance programs serving over 20 million people and spending 
over $5 billion in benefits (51). 
Some of the factors associated with participation weaken the 
candidacy of this program as an automatic stabilizer, at least for the 
period covered in this study. These include variability in subsidy 
levels that make the program much more beneficial at low income levels 
than at higher levels of eligibility, geographic availability of the 
program, willingness and ability to meet the purchase requirement of 
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the program, number of people under public assistance program that are 
categorically eligible for the program, difficulties and costs of becom-
ing certified and obtaining the stamps, lack of willingness to accept 
government subsidies or in-kind benefits of any kind and lack of know-
ledge of program eligibility criteria (51). 1 The eligibility levels of 
the food stamp program are tied eta the retail food prices hence the num-
ber of participants may be rising even during expansion if food price 
increases exceed average consumer incomes. The provision of allowing 
more and more deductions against accountable income for expenditures 
of other sorts makes the program biased toward relatively high income 
people because only families with fair amounts of income can afford 
to purchase much of deductible items (54, p. 14 & 18). 
There is also discretionary element present in determining the 
eligibility of an applicant such as intensive verification of household 
circumstances and interview requirements. The results of such a veri-
fication or interview depend on the judgement of the person conducting 
these inquiries. Food stamps are a payment in kind and can be redeemed 
only for buying edible grocery items for human consumption in the home 
which normally accounts for only a small fraction of total household 
expenditures. For example, a consumer expenditure survey reported that 
the average family of four spent 13 percent of its total income for 
this purpose during 1972 and 1973. This may be 17 percent after allow-
ing for the increase in the cost of food items since than (54, p. 7). 
The relationship between unemployment and rates of participation 
in the Food Stamp Program has not been strong enough to support the 
argument of the program expenditures being pro-cyclical. According to 
a National Survey of participants conducted in November, 1973, only 
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30 percent of the adult participants were in the labor force and out of 
these 30 percent only nine percent were unemployed.· About 43 percent of 
all participants were children of 5-18 years of age and 11.3 percent are 
older people age 65 and over thus less than 50 percent of all partici-
pants belong to potential workers (54, p. 11 & 30}. 
While looking at the total cost of the Food Stamp program we ob-
1 
serve that the program expenditures have consistently shown an upward 
trend since 1969 and have not declined during expansions. Total program 
cost curing fiscal 1969 stood at 240.2 million dollars. It was 563.7 
million dollars during fiscal 1970 and went up to 2,189.5 million 
dollars in fiscal 1973 even though the economy was expanding during 
that period (54}. During fiscal year 1975, $4,599 million were spent 
by the government on Food Stamps. During the same year, the expendi-
ture on general retirement, disability insurance and unemployment in-
surance amounted ta $89.8 billion. Thus, the expenditures on Food Stamps 
was five percent of the other income maintenance programs (61). 
In view of the above mentioned facts Food Stamp program has not 
been considered as an automatic stabilizer for the purpose of this 
study. It may however, be pointed out that Congressional mandate of 
P.L. 93-86 (the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973) 
broadened the program by making it available nationwide by gradually 
switching projects from Food Distribution to Food Stamp proQram, 
completing the transition in fiscal 1975. Moreover, eligibility 
requirements were nationalized under 1971 amendments of the program (54). 
The relationship between unemployment and participation in the Food 
Stamp program has also been improving lately. It has, been estimated 
that during fiscal 1974 and 1975, for every increase of TOO'pefsons 
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unemployed, there was an increase of 65 persons participating in the 
program (54). More recently, purchase requirements have been eliminated. 
This has moved the program very much in the direction of a cash income 
maintenance program. A 11 these recent improvements in the program 
could very well weaken the role of discretionary forces and make the 
program expenditures more or less flexible to changing economic activ~ty. 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), started in 1935, 
is another income maintenance program designed primarily to help eli-
gible needy families with dependent children in emergency or crisis 
situations to avoid destitution or provide living arrangements. Needy 
families with dependent children deprived of parental support or care 
because of a parent's death, continued absence, disability or (in 23 
states) father being unemployed, families with children needing emer-
gency welfare assistance, destitute repatriates, needy aged, blind 
or permanently and totally disabled persons in Guam, Puerto Rico, the 
. Northern Marianas, and the Virgin Islands are eligible to apply to 
their respective state or local welfare agencies. Following an amend-
ment in 1967, states may, if they wish, make federally aided payments 
to families having an unemployed father (64). Individuals must meet 
state eligibility requirements (62). 
The families receiving aid are generally headed by a female with 
father either have deserted the family or not married to the woman. 
A study done in 1971 revealed that only about 19 percent of the AF1DC · 
families had the father in the home. Out of this 19 percent 'Only in six 
''".1~ 
percent of the cases the father was unemployed. More than 45 percent 
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of the families had marital breakups, i.e., desertion, separation or 
divorced. A considerable number of cases (27.7 percent) were those 
where the father was not married to the mother. Moreover, unemployed 
father segment of the program was important only in California, Illi-
nois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington. In other 
states, the families aided on the basis of unemployed father were small 
(56). Until 1975 only 23 states and the District of Columbia have 
elected to provide assistance to families with unemployed father (65). 
A later study in 1973 showed that 83 percent of the families on 
AFDC had father absent from home. The major cause of the absence of 
father from home was marital breakup .. In about 50 percent of the fami-
lies parents were either divorced, separated or father had deserted 
the farni l y. Forty-five point six percent of the families had one or 
more i 11 egi timate children. Only four percent of the families had fa-
thers that were unemployed (55). 
It appears that there has been a rise in the share of such fami-
1 ies on AFDC where father was absent from home. Also the number of 
families having marital breakups and illegitimate children has increased 
among those receiving aid under this program. This indicates that 
the dominant factors affecting the growth of the AFDC program expendi-
tures are social in nature like rate of marriage breakups and rate of 
birth of illegitimate children which are not directly related to the 
general business conditions. On the other hand, the unemployed father 
segment of the program has not increased significantly enough to make 
the program cyclical in nature. Though payments under this program 
would increase somewhat during an economic slowdown they are not likely 




Although the concept of automatic stabilizers had been known before 
it became important only after the studies by the ColTlllittee for Econo-
mic Development, Friedman, Hart, Musgrave and Miller. General idea 
behind the definition of the automatic stabilizers is the same. That 
is, they are the budget components which change automatically in re~ 
sponse to a change in the economic activity thus reducing the subse-
quent changes in national income. Yet, there is nothing like the 
definition of automatic stabilizers. 
Distinction has been made between the automatic monetary and fis-
cal stabilizers. The former are concerned with the stock of money 
supply, whereas the latter refer to the budget items such as taxes and 
transfer payments. Distinction is also made between the output and 
price stabilizers. This is warranted by the fact that during both the 
expansions and recessions covered in the present study, the economy 
was experiencing inflation. During recessions, for example, an auto-
matic decline in taxes and rise in transfer payments will stabilize 
real output by reducing the decline in income but, at the same time, it 
will add to inflation and hence automatic stabilizers will be price 
destabilizing. 
Individual tncome tax, corporate income tax, excise taxes, social 
security taxes and benefits, and unemployment insurance contributions 
and benefits are considered as the major automatic stabilizers. Some 
of the other federal transfer programs, such as Farm Price Support Pro-
gram, Food Stamp Program and Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
are not included as automatic stabilizers in this study for several 
reasons. For example, the operation of some of these programs is 
influenced by the discretionary action of the authorities concerned. 
Moreover, some of these programs were not as important until 1975, 
the termination point of this study. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1At the end of fiscal 1969, less than one-half of the counties in 
the United States were operating Food Stamp Programs. In December, 1974, 
17.3 million people participated in this program out of an estimated 
29.2 million eligible persons. Thus on an average Food Stamp partici-
pation rate was 59 percent. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Introduction 
It was not only the theoretical aspect of the compensatory mechan-
ism of automatic stabilizers that had drawn the attention of the econo-
mists. Authoritative empirical studies have also been done on this sub-
ject. These studies have, in general, suggested that automatic stabili-
zers have contributed significantly to the stability of the economy. 
The empirical studies, however, have differed in several ways 
especially with respect to their specific purpose and the budget items 
included in the analysis. Some researchers have undertaken to measure 
the built-in flexibility of certain selected taxes and transfer payments. 
That is, their objective was to quantify the induced absolute change 
in certain tax revenues or transfer payments following a change in the 
economic activity. This is expressed as }~, where ti T is the ab soil ute 
change in a certain tax or transfer payment item and ti Y is the change 
in national income. Obviously, the multiple effects of an initial 
change in personal disposable incomes and corporate profits after taxes 
were not considered (67)(40)(41)(10)(30)(43)(49)(46). Studies of se-
lected taxes and transfer payments have also been done in order to 
measure precisely the extent of automatic stability they have pro-
vided in the economy (50)(44)(66). This was made possible by extend-
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ing the analysis further so as to incorporate the multiplier effects 
on national income by an initial change in consumption and investment. 
This way, not only the absolute change in taxes and transfer payments 
following a change in economic activity were included but their final 
effect on national income, via multiple changes in consumption and 
investment were also captured. A few comprehensive studies dealing 
with effectiveness of all the automatic stabilizers have also been 
done. A brief review of these studies will be presented in the fol-
lowing pages. These studies can be classified as those measuring 
(i) the built-in flexibility and (ii) the effectiveness of automatic 
stabilizers. 
Built-in Flexibility of Automatic Stabilizers 
Built-in flexibility refers to the induced absolute dollar change 
in a certain tax revenue or transfer payment following a change in 
national income. It can be expressed as 6. T/6. Y where 6. T is the change 
in tax revenue/transfer payment and 6.Y is the change in income. The 
change in income may have been the result of a change in expenditures, 
like investment or government spending, etc. 
A. G. Hart (23) was probably the first to analyze the built-in 
flexibility of various automatic stabilizers individually as well as 
in aggregated form. However, his earlier work was based on very rough 
approximations without involving the use of actual data. For example, 
a hypothetical decline of $10 billion in national income was assumed 
and the estimates of the changes it would br1ng in various taxes and 
transfer payments were arrived at on the basis of tax and transfer 
payment rates and their value with respect to national income in 1948, 
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the time this analysis was done. For example, in the case of corporate 
taxes, Hart concluded that if corporate profits tax rate is 40 percent 
and corporate profits are about 10 percent of national income, taxes 
will change by four percent with a change in national income. 
Later on, A. G. Hart, P. B. Kennen and Alan D. Entine (26) analyzed 
the built-in flexibility of automatic stabilizers in a more systematic 
manner. They worked with the actual data for the 1954 (II) through 
1963 (III) period, which included two recessions, two complete and part 
of the third expansion. The data were used to analyze the counter-
cyclical rather than counter-recessionary behavior of automatic stabi-
lizers, the subject of Hart's earlier work. 
Changes in GNP, federal taxes, and unemployment compensation be-
tween the trough and peak quarters and vice versa were computed. The 
changes in taxes and unemployment compensation were then represented 
as percents of change in GNP. This is referred to as the swing of a 
particular stabilizer for a particular sub-period. Simple addition 
of the swings in individual stabilizers for each period gives the over-
all built-in flexibility of the arsenal of automatic stabilizers for 
that particular period. 
It was estimated that all the stabilizers together provided a 
built-in flexibility of 35 to 40 percent of the change in national in-
come. There was no significant difference in the built-in flexibility 
during expansions and contractions. Corporate taxes were the most im-
portant with a flexibility range of 14 to 20 percent followed by 
personal taxes, unemployment compensation and indirect taxes. The 
estimates of built-in flexibility include some rough approximation for 
the contribution of state and local taxes and social security contribu-
tions. 
The estimates of built-in flexibility of automatic stabilizers 
give the extent to which a change in national income will be absorbed 
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by changes in tax revenues and transfer payments. The~ are not directly 
useful in determining the full contribution of automatic stabilizers 
toward the stability of the economy because they do not take into con-
sideration the multiple effects on national income of an initial 
change in consumption and investment, etc. Nevertheless, the imper-
tance of these budget items as automatic stabilizers is made clear. 
M. 0. Clement ( 9) has measured countercyclical contribution of 
the automatic stabilizers for the period 1948 (I) - 1957 (III), covering 
two contractions, two complete and part of the third expansion. The 
method used to determine the built-in flexibility of automatic stabili-
zers was generally the same as applied earlier by Hart, Kennen and 
Entine. However, the data for national income, taxes and transfer 
payments were adjusted for seasonal fluctuations as well as for any 
discretionary rate changes in taxes and transfer payments. The adjust-
ments for rate changes were made with the help of treasury estimates. 
Adjustment is desirable in order to separate the effects of the auto-
matic stabilizers from the effects of rate changes. 
The results obtained by Clement further enhanced the importance 
of automatic stabilizers in the economy. The range of total built-in 
flexibility of all the stabilizers together was 23 to 36 percent dur-
' 
ing expansions and 14 to 89 percent during contractions. On the aver-
age, automatic stabilizers had a built-in flexibility of 51 percent 
during contractions and 28 percent during expansions. In other words, 
on an average, 51 percent of a decline in national income during con-
tractions was offset by the decrease in taxes and increase in transfer 
payments; an average of 28 percent of an increase in national income 
was offset by an increase in taxes and decrease in transfer payments 
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during expansions. The order of importance of the automatic stabilizers 
on individual basis was the same as reported earlier by Hart, Kennen 
and Entine. Clement, however, showed that excise taxes were destabiliz-
ing during contractions. These results indicate extreme variability 
of the impact of stabilizers from one expansion or contraction to the 
other. Clement attributed the unusually low estimate (14%) of built-in 
• 
flexibility computed for 1948-49 recession to the very small drop in 
national income during that period. 
An additional feature of Clement's analysis is that he carried 
his work beyond what had been done before. He attempted a multiplier 
approach to ascertain the effect of automatic stabilizers on national 
income via-their effect on consumption expenditures. Clement observed 
that with a given change in national income the shift in disposable 
income will be smaller in a system with automatic stabilizers relative 
to what it would be in the absence of stabilizers. Two consumption 
functions were derived, one based on post 1948 (I) data taken from 
expansions and the other one on postwar data from contractions. Esti-
mates of the swings in automatic stabilizers were used to determine 
the changes in disposable incomes following a given change in national 
income. In a system with no automatic stabilizers, it was assumed that 
any change in national income will be fully reflected in the correspond-
ing change in disposable income. Use of the consumption functions 
was then made to get estimates of the changes in consumption outlays in 
two different systems, one with and the other without automatic stabi-
lizers. A comparison of the results then led to the conclusion that 
the present built-in stabilizers are capable of preventing a change 
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in consumption outlays of 33 percent and 62 percent during expansions 
and contractions, respectively. These results include the effect of 
automatic stabilizers on consumption through ~hanges in disposable 
income and in federal securities held by individuals. The automatic 
increase in taxes during economic expansions results into government 
budget surplus. This, in turn, would cause government securities out-
standing to fall by the amount of the budget surplus. The decline in 
the individually held part of the securities will bring about a decline 
in consumption expenditures. The opposite of what has been described 
will happen in the case of economic contractions. The effect of auto-
matic stabilizers on investment is not considered in the analysis. 
Clement 1 s overall conclusion is that automatic stabilizers are powerful 
countercyclical weapons and that they contribute significantly to 
economic stability. 
The period covered by Wilfred Lewis, Jr. (31) in his study of the 
automatic stabilizers, was relatively longer than in the case of earlier 
studies. His analysis stretches from 1948 to 1961, covering four 
recessions, three complete and a part of the fourth expansion. 
Lewis distinguished between the direct and indirect stabilizers. 
Individual income tax liabilities,· employment taxes·and unemployment 
compensatjon were defined as direct stabilizers because they have 
their primary effect on disposable personal income. On the other hand, 
corporate tax accruals and excise taxes are indirect stabilizers since 
their effects on disposable personal income are not direct and depends 
on the corporation 1 s employment and dividend payment policies. Another 
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significant feature of this study is that fiscal effects and economic 
significance of built-in stabilizers are separated. 
While analyzing the fiscal effects, Lewis was concerned with the 
measurement of the impact of built-in stabilizers on the federal deficit 
or surplus. This is the same as determining the built-in flexibility of 
the stabilizers. The basic methodology is also the same applied earlier 
by Hart, Kennen and Entine (26) and Clement(9), the only difference being 
in the adjustment of data for changes in tax laws. Whereas Hart, Kennen 
and Entine did not make any adjustments (no major changes were made in 
the tax rates during the period which they studied) and Clement used 
treasury estimates, Lewis adjusted the data by multiplying actual re-
corded tax accruals by the ratio of pre-recession to actual tax rates. 
The results obtained by Lewis indicated that the built-in fiscal 
stabilizers have contributed substantially to the stability of the 
postwar economy. He estimated that the fiscal stabilizers have account-
ed for roughly 40 percent to over 120 percent of the decline in GNP 
during recessions and about 30 to 34 percent of the subsequent rise in 
' GNP during expansicns. In the case of expansions, these results were 
not much different than what was found earlier by Hart, Kennen and Entine 
and Clement. However, extreme variability in the impact of automatic 
stabilizers during contractions can be noticed once again plus the fact 
that the stabilizers are far more effective during recessions. These 
results also indicate that the indirect stabilizers which include cor-
porate profit taxes as the only major item have consistently shown a 
rise in their.built-in flexibility over the years, 25 percent during 
1948-50 to 73 percent in 1960-61 recession. 
The economic significance of built-in stabilizers refers to their 
overall impact on the level of economic activity. Lewis pointed out 
that the precise measurement of such an impact is not possible since 
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it depends on the behavior of the consumers and businesses. However, 
Lewis recognized that the stabilizers reduced the size of the multi-
plier and hence the total cumulative change in national change follow-
ing an autonomous change in expenditures. Lewis estimated that during 
1953-54 recession, business savings and the indirect fiscal stabilizers 
together offset about two-thirds of the decline in GNP. An additional 
one-fourth of the decline in GNP was offset by the direct fiscal sta-
bilizers. Assuming marginal propensity to consume of 0.9 (derived by 
Bert G. Hickman (29) using data for 1921-29 and 1947-48) and using 
these ratios of the decline in GNP that was offset by the stabilizers 
during 1953-54 recession, Lewis computed a multiplier of 1.08. The 
multiplier would have been 1.42 had the direct stabilizers (individual 
income tax, employment taxes and unemployment compensation) not been in 
operation. This roughly translates to the conclusion that the operation 
of the direct stabilizers alone could reduce one-third of the potential 
change in national income. Lewis's main contribution in this part of 
the analysis is the detailed and highly useful discussion of the· 
theoretical aspects of the effects of .automatic stabilizers on the 
level of economic activity. 
Lewis noted that although indirect stabilizers, especially the 
corporate income tax, have greater budget flexibility, their primary 
or first round effect on the level of economic activity is not quite 
significant. The argument being that changes in corporate profits tax 
liabilities have a very small effect on investment as well as consump-
tion particularly in short recessions where long term profit expecta-
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tions are not altered to a great extent. He observed however, that 
the secondary or induced effects of both the direct and indirect stabi-
1 izers on investment and hence on national income cannot be ignored. 
Another study using a different approach to measure the built-in 
flexibility of taxes and transfer payments was done by James S. Duesen-
berry, Otto Eckstein and Gary Frorrm (12). An econometric model was 
constructed to compute a'set of hypothetical values for GNP and dispos-
able income, quarterly from 4th quarter 1957 through the second quarter 
of 1959 both for what they called a medium recession and a more severe 
recession referred to as the 1disaster model. 1 
The approach used in the above study though different in structure 
'is basically the same as was adopted earlier by Hart, Kennen and Entine 
(26) and Clement (9). Changes in taxes/transfer payments are compared 
to the changes in GNP. The results indicated that from 45 to 64 percent 
of the decline in the disposable income was offset by the built-in sta-
bilizers. These estimates are higher than those of the Hart, Kennen and 
Entine and Clement studies but lower than that of Lewis (31). As be-
fore, the corporate income tax was found to be the leading built-in 
stabilizer. But, contrary to earlier studies, transfer payments were 
found to be more important than personal taxes as a stabilizer. 
Effectiveness of Automatic Stabilizers 
The preceding section was concerned with the review of the studies 
dealing primarily with the budget flexibility or simply revenue effects 
of the automatic stabilizers. This section will be devoted to the 
review of some of the major studies regarding the effectiveness of 
automatic stabilizers. The effectiveness of automatic stabilizers 
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which is synonymous with the expression 'economic significance' used 
by Lewis, is concerned with the contribution of automatic stabilizers 
to the overall stability of 'the economy by reducing the changes in 
national income. Multiple effects on national income of an initial 
change in consumption and i~vestment expenditures are considered. The 
operation of automatic stabilizers in reducing changes in national 
income was discussed in the previous chapter. Since the process 
involves the use of multiplier models, most of the studies dealing 
with the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers have adopted the multi-
plier approach. 
The studies dealing with the effectiveness of automatic stabili-
zers are generally of two types: static and dynamic. 
Static Analysis 
Static Analysis is a comparison of two equilibrium positions. It 
concerns itself with examining the effectiveness of automatic stabili-
zers over the entire expansion or contraction and does not investigate 
the actual time path of the adjustment process of the economy. Some 
of the important studies under this category will be reviewed presently. 
It is to the credit of Richard A. Musgrave and Merton H. Miller 
(.35) that the first systematic approach incorporating the multiplier 
effects was derived to test and measure the compensatory effectiveness 
of built-in flexibility. It is this formulation which has been the 
basis of most of the latter studies (39)(68){1)(44)(5Q). 1 The approach 
assumes two separate tax systems, one with and the other without the 
built-in flexibility of taxes and transfer payments. To put it differ-
ently, in the former system, taxes and transfer payments are function 
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of income (i.e., they could go up or down with the changes in income) 
whereas in the latter system, taxes/transfer payments are fixed and do 
not change with the level of income. Personal and corporate income 
taxes, excise taxes and transfer payments are combined in the single 
category of personal taxes. This was made possible in the case of 
corporate taxes by treating corporations as unincorporated businesses. 
Excise taxes were treated as personal taxes assessed on an expenditure 
basis and finally, transfer payments were simply considered as negative 
taxes. Total income was then defined as personal income plus corporate 
profits before tax (but after dividends which are already included in 
personal income). 
The fraction of the change in income which is prevented by the 
operation of these stabilizers is expressed as 
where t:,. Y refers to the change in income in a system with built-in 
flexibility and t:,. Y is the change in income with no such built-in 
a: 
flexibility. An appropriate macro model is specified and solved for 
the values oft:,. Y terms. The coefficient for the effectiveness of 




where c = marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income 
plus retained corporate profits. 
r1 = average rate of the entire tax system in the initial period, 
i.e., T/Y (T stands for total tax revenue minus transfer 
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payments and Y is the total income as defined above). 
E = weighted average of the income elasticities of separate 
tax sources. 
As mentioned earlier, the work done by Musgrave and Miller served 
as a foundation for many latter studies but it too was not without 
its limitations. The most important limitation is their handling of 
the corporate sector. It does not make a distinction between the 
effect of retained corporate earnings and personal disposable income 
on the economy. Both are subjected to the same marginal propensity 
to consume. Moreover, the induced effect on investment is ignored 
in this formulation. 
As far as their empirical analysis is concerned, Musgrave and 
Miller estimated that the built-in stabilizers prevented approximately 
36 percent of a change in national income. In other words, over a 
third of the change in national income due to an initial change in 
investment is offset by the automatic stabilizers. This result 
clearly indicates that the stabilizers have considerable influence 
on the stability of the economy. However, except for the personal 
income and corporate profits, most of the data used for taxes and 
transfer payments were based on estimates rather than actual data, 
rendering the results less reliable. Moreover, a fixed value of 
c = 0.652 was used implying that the results will be valid only if 
the value of c remained the same over the entire period,,of the study. 
Also, the analysis was not carried for the explicit purpose of finding 
the countercyclical effectiveness of automatic stabilizers since the 
period, 1946-47, used in the analysis was described as normal (36). 3 
David w. Lusher (33) analyzed the stabilizing effectiveness of 
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budget flexibility along the lines similar to those adopted by Mus-
grave and Miller. However, there were two important differences which 
resulted into a structural~y different formula derived by Lusher. First, 
he included fl exi b 1 e expenditure programs by the government in the 1 i st 
of automatic stabilizers to be evaluated. 
Flexible expenditure programs include (a) appropriations or major 
programs whose expenditures could change without fresh congressional 
authority or administrative discretion, e.g. interest on public debt, 
(b) programs requiring supplemental appropriations by congress so as 
to carry out expenditure commitments made under existing policies 
(example, public assistance grants to states and veterans• pension 
and readjustment benefits), (c) programs financed by public debt 
authorization, for example, farm price support operations and mortgage 
purchase programs, (d) programs under which expenditure changes could 
be brought about by administrative action but only to the extent that 
funds are available and do not need fresh congressional mandate (ex-
ample, speedup in letting contracts and an increase in the rate of 
construction on rivers and reclamation projects, etc.), (e) programs 
where expenditures would change because of changes in the prices of 
goods and services involved. Most of these programs, however, are not 
independent of the discretionary action by the authorities and may, 
therefore, not qualify as automatic stabilizers. 
Second, Lusher used a different benchmark in his study. He 
analyzed the effectiveness of budget flexibility under the existing, 
that is, variable tax system with reference to a proportional tax 
system. It may be recalled that Musgrave and Miller (35) meas.11ire-d the 
effectiveness of built-in stabilizers in the variable tax system with 
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reference to a system where taxes and transfer payments do not change 
in response to the changes in income. In the proportional tax/transfer 
payment system, the average effective tax rate does not change, that is, 
effective rate flexibility is zero, abs·olute flexibility is positive 
and income elasticity is equal to one. The implication of.using propor-
tional tax system as a benchmark is that only the tax changes which are 
greater than the proportional changes in national income will be consi-
dered stabilizing; a proportional change in taxes will be neutral and 
less than proportional will be destabilizing. 
According to Lusher, the amount of change in income prevented by 
the existence of built-in flexibility is measured relative to the hypo-
thetical change that might have occurred in the absence of such flexi-
bility. This is expressed as 
where v1 refers to the initial gross national expenditure or income; 
v2 refers to the gross national expenditures or income in the terminal 
period when changes in the average effective tax, transfer payments 
and flexible government expenditure rates, following autonomous changes 
in expenditure, are allowed; and v12 is the hypothetical national income 
in a system of proportional taxes when their average effective rates 
remain unchanged. 
After working with an appropriate macro model, Lusher came up 
with the following formulation for ~, the coefficient of stabilizing 
flexibility: 
where 
cp = y2 rc(6.r - il t) - 6.g] 
L- il (I + G) 
c = marginal propensity to consume 
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6. r, 6. t, 6. g = changes in average effective rate of a 11 the taxes 
combined, transfer payments and flexible govern-
ment expenditures respectively between the initial 
and terminal period. 
6.I = change in investment expenditures 
6.G = change in prograrrmed government expenditures for 
goods and services. 
As is apparent, this formulation requires the determination of 
change in both investment and prograrruned government expenditures over 
the period under investigation as well as the change in effective 
rates of taxes, transfer payments and flexible government expenditures. 
Moreover, it measures the change in income prevented by the change in 
the average rates of taxes/expenditures, not by the absolute dollar 
change as was the case in Musgrave-Miller (35) analysis. 
Coefficient of stabilizing flexibility estimated by Lusher for 
actual yearly changes for the 1929-32 and 1937-38 period ranged from a 
minimum of nine to a maximum of 30 percent of a change in income. This 
result, which is not quite significant statistically, may have been 
due to the particular tax structure prevailing in those years. For 
example, in 1940 the federal individual and corporate income tax, the 
most important of the automatic stabilizers, were 36 percent of the 
GNP while sales and excise taxes not so important as stabilizers, were 
32 percent of GNP (37). However, the results found for the half-yearly 
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hypothetical recession model covering 1953 II - 1955 I period gave 
larger coefficients of stability than those of the Musgrave and Miller 
study. It was estimated that during t.hi s period, from 36 to 46 percent 
of the change in national income was prevented by changes in the average 
rates of taxes and expenditures. 
While Musgrave and Miller (35) laid down the groundwork for testing 
the efficiency of automatic stabilizers through a multiplier model, it 
was Peter Eilbott (14) who undertook one of the most comprehensive 
empirical work in this area. Not only did he work with the actual 
data for recessionary and expansionary periods but he also had the 
data adjusted for any legislative rate changes, seasonal fluctuations 
and the lag in collections/disbursements. 
Eilbott's formulation, which in effect is an extension of the one 
developed earlier by Musgrave and Miller, includes some very important 
elements of the analysis ignored in the earlier works. Unlike Musgrave-
Miller and Lusher (33) who combined the various taxes, Eilbott treated 
personal taxes (which included individual income tax plus excise taxes 
plus one-half of social security contributions), transfer payments and 
corporate taxes separately. Moreover, he fully accounted for the -ef-
fects of induced investment. Eilbott's model will be fully developed in 
the next chapter since it will be used for the output stabilization 
part of the present study. 
Eilbott estimated that had 1965 rates been in force, the stabili-
zers, on an average, would have prevented from 36 to 52 percent of the 
decline in income during the three recessions between 1948-60. During 
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the three expansions over the same period, the stabilizers had a lesser 
effectiveness, 25 to 42 percent of the ~hange in national income. Al-
though the numerical values of these results do not seem to be greatly 
different than some of the earlier studies like that of Clement (9) and 
Lusher (33), but they may be more reliable since they are the outcome of 
a more comprehensive analysis. 
Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis specifically includes a time variable and examines 
the time path of the adjustment process. However, as pointed out by 
D. A. L. Auld (2), this kind of analysis also has its shortcomings. 
For example, the methods suggested and used by D. J. Smyth (45), E. T. 
Balopoulos (3) and J. Helliwell and F. Gorbet (28) do not include the 
impact of discretionary changes in the tax structure. 
A common feature in this kind of study is that, in the setting of 
a macroeconometric model, the economy is subjected to exogenous shocks 
of certain amount. Then a series of simulation experiments are made 
both with and without the operation of automatic stabilizers and induced 
changes in income are found after applying a given change in policy. 
These studies, however, had some important differences in their metho-
dology. 
Giuseppe C. Ruggeri (42) used slightly different coefficient of 
stability for recessionary and expansionary situations. For recessions, 
the ratio of percentage peak value change [not absolute change as in 
the case of Musgrave-Miller (35) model] in real GNP with stabilizers to 
percentage peak value change in GNP without the stabilizers is used. 
The coefficient of stability S is expressed as 
s = ~xP _ xt;xP _ xt ) 1- s s ws ws ·xp xP 
s . ws 
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where X refers to real GNP and superscripts p and t stand for peak and 
trough values respectively. Subscript s is for the values when the 
stabilizers are operating, and ws when they are not. It may be noted 
here that the above formulation will reduce to S = l - Xs/X. (similar . ws 
to that of Musgrave-Miller model) if the peak values of GNP are the 
same with and without the stabilizers. 
To measure the drag impact of stabilizers during expansions, Rug-
geri used the ratio of percentage trough value change in real GNP with-
out stabilizers to the percentage trough value change in real GNP with 
stabilizers. The drag coefficient D, which measures the percentage 
reduction in potential real GNP due to the operation of stabilizers is 
( xP _ .xy xP _ x t ) D = 1- l l xt xt 
l ' 
where x1 and X refer to the real GNP without and with the operation of 
the stabilizers respectively. The implication is that only a value of 
D<O will indicate the existence of a fiscal drag during expansions. 
The use of percentage rather than absolute changes in real GNP elimi-
nates the bias that may result if the value of GNP at cyclical peaks 
are different with and without the operation of stabilizers. 
Ruggeri estimated that the automatic stabilizers as a whole pre-
vented a potential fall in GNP from a minimum of 45 percent in 1960-61 
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recession to a maximum of 49 percent in the 1957-58 recession. A mini-
mum of seven and a maximum of 41 percent of a potential increase in GNP 
was checked by the automatic stabilizers during 1961-63 and 1954-57 per-
iod respectively. These results are more or less similar to those found . 
earlier by Clement (9), Lusher (33) and Eilbott (14) •. But there was 
significant turn around in the role of the stabilizers on individual 
basis. For the first time, personal taxes assumed the role of the lead-
ing stabilizer, instead of corporate taxes. 
In their analysis of automatic stabilizers, James A. Chalmers and 
William A. Fischel ( 7) defined the coefficient of stability in the 
same manner as Musgrave and Miller (35). That is, the· cornpartson of the 
multipliers of two different systems, one with and the other without 
automatic stabilizers, yields an estimate of their effectiveness. The 
dY 
expression used is y = 1- d.Ys where dY is the change in income with 
x s 
statilizers and dYx, the change in income without stabilizers. However, 
the derivation of the multipliers by Chalmers and Fischel is done in 
a different way. A thirteen equation macro model of the real sector 
is specified. These equations are written in terms of a matrix of 
coefficients, a column vectorof endogenous variables, and a column 
vector of exogenous and predetermined variables. The system is solved 
by pre-multiplying both sides by the inverse of the matrix of coeffi-
cients. The elements of the inverse matrix are the impact multipliers 
for their respective exogenous variables and are used to measure the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilizers. 
One implication of this approach is that a change in an endogenous 
variable that will occur in one year after a given change in any 
exogenous variable can be readily determined by looking at the relevant 
45 
impact multiplier in the inverse matrix. 
Chalmers and Fischel (7) only considered personal income tax and 
corporate profit taxes in their study. The coefficient of stability is 
computed both for the short run (one year) and long run (four years) 
impacts. The results obtained are almost similar to those of some 
earlier studies. About 34 percent of a change in income will be pre-
vented by the operation of only two of the stabilizers {personal income 
tax and corporate profit taxes) over a period of one year. The effec-
tiveness of these stabilizers wi 11 increase to approximately 49 percent 
if their impact is considered over a longer (four year) period. Just 
like the findings of Ruggeri (42), and contra~y to all the previ.ous stud-
ies personal income tax was the most important of the two stabilizers. 
Arnold H. Packer and Frank C. Ripley (38) had a different purpose 
in their study of the automatic stabilizers. They compared the strength 
of automatic .stabilizers in 1952 to that of 1972 (both years were part 
of expansions) to see whether the economy's power to resist sudden 
changes has improved or not. A different approach was employed to 
compute the coefficient of stability. As a matter of fact, the coeffi-
cient was split into the final demand stabilizer and income stabilizer. 
The former related to the impact of a particular stabilizer on the final 
demand following a given change in expenditures. This is expressed as 
e. = b.[~r.)p.GNP + r.~p.)GNP + r.p~GNP]/-D 
1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
where for each stabilizer i, 
ei = the final demand stabilizer 
b. = the appropriate marginal propensity to spend 
1 
ri = the rate of taxes/expenditures 
p. = the share of GNP 
1 
D = the exogenous shock to the economy. 
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The above equation, which in effect decomposes the income change 
induced by each stabilizer, measures the first round response of final 
demand to an exogenous shock to the economy of D/GNP percent. The 
impact of the stabilizers on income was computed by the evaluation of 
the following equation: 
Is=-(~ ei/bi)D/GNP 
1 
Packer and Ripley estimated that the impact of the stabilizers 
on income in 1972 virtually stayed at the same level as it was in 1955. 
The stabilizers prevented 29.5 percent of a change in income in 1955 
and 31.4 percent in 1972. Therefore, they concluded that the automatic 
stabilizers are too weak to keep the economy on track once it reaches 
full employment. · 
It should be pointed out that the evaluation of automatic stabili-
zers on calendar year basis may not be very useful. The impact of the 
stabilizers can best be investigated with reference to cyclical changes 
in income. Furthermore, the simple comparison of the strength of auto-
matic stabilizers in 1955 to that of 1972 may not be helpful because 
of the changes that have occurred in the tax structure and other rela-
tionships in the economy. 
Summary 
Most of the earlier studies of automatic stabilizers were concerned 
only with their built-in flexibility thus computing only the absolute 
changes in revenues/expenditures following a change in income. These 
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studies proved that a significant amount of built-in flexibility exists 
in the economy due to the operation of automatic stabilizers. But it 
was soon realized that this measure alone was not sufficient to guage 
the over all impact of these stabilizers. A particular tax may have 
greater revenue flexibility in absolute terms but may have a limited 
impact on the economy as far as the stability is concerned. 
It was with this consideration that the studies of the effective-
ness of automatic stabilizers were undertaken in the context of multi-
plier models. Some of these relatively more comprehensive analyses 
were of static nature, comparing two equilibrium situations and involv-
ing the use of actual data while others used econometric forecasting 
models and had some dynamic elements in them to track the course of 
the time path of GNP. 
The general findings were that the automatic stabilizers contri-
buted significantly to the stability of the postwar economy. They 
were responsible, on the average, for offsetting about one-third of the 
changes in income during expansions and as much as one-half of the 
change in income during recessions. According to the findings of some 
earlier studies, corporate income tax was relatively more important 
as a stabilizer. The latter studies, however, showed that personal 
income tax and transfer payments are becoming more and more important 
in this respect. 
FOOTNOTES 
1This point will become clear after reading the review of the 
studies immediately following this one. 
2The value of c was obtained by correlating total net private 
saving with disposable income plus corporate saving for the period 
1929-41. 





As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of automatic fiscal sta-
bilizers in the present study will be discussed in terms of output and 
price stability. For measuring output stability, the model first deve-
loped by Musgrave and Miller (35) and later extended by Eil'bott (14) 
is more appropriate and will be used here. However, some modifications 
are made to measure the effectiveness of individual stabilizers. A 
procedure suggested by Brown ( 6) will be used to test the effective-
ness of the stabilizers so far as price stability is concerned (2). -Pre-
sently, the specification of the model to be used in this study will 
be undertaken. The data must be adjusted for seasonal variations, 
collection lags and legislative changes in the tax laws, if any. This 
process will be fully elaborated in the next chapter. 
The Model for Measuring Output Stabilization 
Following Musgrave and Miller, let us assume that (a) government 
expenditures are for goods and services and are constant, (b) all 
taxes a re from the pers,ona 1 income tax, ( c) no corporate saving 
occurs, (d) investment is not affected by taxes, and (e) there are no 
imports and exports. It should be pointed out, however, that allowing 
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imports and exports will not change anything in our analysis since they 
will not be affected by the automatic stabilizers. Any change in income 
between the two periods may be expressed as:1 
(1) 
where 
t. Y = the change in national income between the initial 
and the terminal period (Y2 - Y1). 
&I = the change in investment between the two periods 
c = marginal propensity to consume out of disposable 
income. 
r1, r 2 = average rate of tax (T/Y) in the initial and the 
terminal period respectively. 
v1, v2 = national income in the initial and terminal period 
respectively. 
The income elasticity (E) of the tax yield (T) is defined as the 
percentage change in the tax yield in the initial period divided by 
the percentage change in income in the same period. Thus 
E =t.T/T +t.Y/Y 
which is the same as 
E = ~Tit. Y){Y/T) (2) 
Solving for ti T, we get 
t. T = (Et..Y){T/Y) (3) 
Since 6. T also equals r2v2 - r1 v1, we can substitute equation (3) in 
equation (1), therefore 
1:::,_y =t::,_I + ct::,_Y - c(Et:.Y)(T/Y) (4) 
which can be simplified as 
(5) 
If r1 is substituted for T/Y, we have 
t:. Y = 6. I 6 -c ! cEr1] (6) 
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In the above expression, 1 is, in effect, the multi-1 - c + cEr1 
plier of the system where automatic stabilizers are operating. Let 
us call this change in income as /:::,_ Vs. In a system where there are no 
automatic stabilizers or where taxes are fixed instead of being the 
function of income, the income elasticity of taxes will be zero. 
Therefore, the change in income following an autonomous change in 
investment in such a system, which we will refer to as 1:::,_yws' will be 
6.Y =6.I l 
ws l - c (7) 




The 6. Y/b. Yws term is the ratio of the change in income in the parti-
cular tax system with built-in flexibility to the change in income in a 
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system with no such built-in flexibility. If this ratio were equal to 
one it would mean that the change in income is the same in both the 
systems, with or without the built-in flexibility. This will make 
a = 0, meaning no impact whatsoever of automatic stabilizers on income. 
But in the case where the value of this ratio, /1 Y/11 Yws is less than 
one, it would indicate that the change in income when automatic sta-
bilizers are qperating is smaller than the change in income if there 
are no automatic stabilizers. By whatever amount this ratio is less 
than one is the extent of the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers. 
11 y 
Therefore, a= 1 - l1Ys gives the fraction of the change in income 
ws 
prevented by the operation of automatic stabilizers. 
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (8) gives 
a = 
cEr1 (9) 
According to Eilbott's (14) formulation, which explicitly includes 
the effect of transfer payments and a'ilows separation between the cor-
porate and personal sector, any change in income following a change in, 
say, investment, can be expressed as 2 
where 
( 10) 
11 Z = change in the sume of corporate profits with inventory 
valuation and capital consumption adjustments, before 
taxes minus dividends plus corporate social insurance 
contributions. 
53 
u1, u2 = average rate of transfer payments (U/Y) in the initial 
and terminal period respectively. 
i = marginal propensity to invest. 
t 1, t 2 · = average rate of corporate taxes (T/Y) in the initial 
and terminal period respectively. 
The rest of the variables are defined as before. 
If we define Y - Z = X = personal income - government transfer 
payments - business transfer payments - net interest + personal social 
security contributions+ excess of wage accruals; r2v2 - r1v1 = AR= 
change in personal taxes between the initial and the terminal period; 
u2 Y 2 - u1Y1 = AU = change in transfer payments between the i ni ti al 
. and the terminal period; and finally t 2v2 - t 1 v1 = AT = change in the 
amount of corporate taxes between these two periods, then equation (10) 
can be written as: 
6.Y =6.I + C6.X - CAR+ ct.U + i AZ - i AT (11) 
Income elasticity of personal taxes, Er is expressed as 
( 12) 
where R1 refers to the amount of personal taxes in the initial period. 
Solving for AR, gives 
Income elasticity of transfer payments, Eu is 
where ul is the level of transfer payments in the initial period. 





Similarly, the income elasticity for corporate taxes, Et is 
where T1 is the level of corporate taxes in period one. Solving for 
11 T, we get 
( 17) 
Substituting for the terms 11R, fl U, and fl T in equation 11, we get 
( 18) 
which can be rearranged such that 
(19) 
Dividing through by /1 Y and substituting r1, u1 and t 1 for R1Jv1, u11v1 
and T1Jv1 respectively, we get 
Rearrang;ng terms yields 
(21) 
In fact, this is the expression for fl Vs' the change in income in a 
system having automatic stabilizers. The corresponding expression for 
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ti Yws' the change in income with no such stabilizers, which will have 
zero income elasticities of personal taxes, transfer payments and cor-
porate taxes, i.e., Er= Eu= Et= 0, will be 
ti.I fly -
- l - c ti XI ti Y - i ti Z/ ti Y (22) 
After substituting (21) and (22) into equation (8) and simplifying, 
we get 
(23) 
The above formulation, which measures the effectiveness of automa-
tic fiscal stabilizers as a whole, will be used to estimate the output 
stabilization strength of these stabilizers. That is, to what extent 
the automatic stabilizers were effective in preventing changes in output 
over the business cycle. Since our concern here will be with the real 
output, the relevant data are in terms of constant dollars. 
In order to determine the relative effectiveness of individual 
automatic stabilizers, equation 23 must be disaggregated. For 
example, to determine the effectiveness of personal taxes as a stabili-
zer, we assume that transfer payments and corporate taxes are fixed 
and that only personal taxes change with the changes in income. In 
other words, the income elasticities of transfer payments and corporate 
taxes are assumed to be zero. The coefficient of stability for per-
sonal taxes will take the form: 
(24) 
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Assuming transfer payments flexible and personal taxes and corpor-
ate taxes constant we get the following coefficient of stability for 
transfer payments: 
be 
-cE u u l (25) 
Similarly, the coefficient of stability for corporate taxes will 
(26) 
Limitations of the Model 
Although the model described in the previous section is f4irly 
comprehensive and covers most of the aspects of automatic stabilizers, 
it does have its limitations. Some important limitations are: 
1) The model is static in nature. It compares two equilibrium 
situations and does not trace the actual time path of adjustment pro-
cess. Yet, it suits the purpose of this study, which is to determine 
the extent to which the automatic stabilizers were responsible for 
reducing changes in income from, say, peak to trough and vice versa 
in a particular cycle. It is sometimes argued that the static measures 
take into account two equilibrium situations which may not exist. But 
the measures suggested by this model do not necessarily imply that two 
equilibrium situations are compared. So long as changes in income 
between the two periods are derived on the basis of actual rather than 
hypothetical data, the purpose of the study is served. 
2) It may be argued that instead of using actual peak and trough 
values of national income, the trend values found through interpolation 
should be used. The use of actual values may have an upward bias in 
the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers. Howeyer, it should be 
remembered that the automatic stabilizers, by their very nature, are 
always operating and change direction with the movements in incomes. 
Therefore, the hypothetical trend values may not be reached so long 
as the automatic stabilizers are active. 
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3) The elasticity measures used in this model are those of arc 
elasticities. Thus, the results obtained with the help of such elasti-
cities will be relevant only for the average effectiveness of automatic 
stabilizers over the entire downturn or upturn. On the basis of such 
results, it cannot necessarily be said that the automatic stabilizers 
were offsetting a particular percentage of a change in income at each 
point in a contraction or expansion. 
4) The values for the marginal propensity to cons1Jme and invest 
(c and i) are assumed to remain constant over the cycle, which may 
not be the case. To minimize any potential error, a set of values of 
these parameters will be used. 
5) It should be admitted that this model ignores the influence 
the manipulation of money stocks and interest rates may have on the 
level of aggregate demand and hence on output. In fact, the movements 
in interest payments will affect the level of consumption and invest-
ments and in turn, the national income. 
6) The effect on income of the induced changes in government 
spending on goods and services as a result of the automatic changes in 
tax revenues or benefit payments is also ignored. For this reason, 
the results obtained may not indicate the actual effectiveness of auto-
matic stabilizers, which can only be true if the government spending 
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on goods and services remained unchanged. 
These qualifications must be borne in mind while deriving any 
conclusions from the results obtained with the application of the above 
mentioned model. 
A Measure of Price Stabilization 
According to Brown ( 6) nominal taxes can only act as price sta-
bilizers if they increase in a greater proportion than the increase 
in the price level. Transfer payments have to do the opposite to 
become price stabilizers. For a particular tax, i, the following 
measure is used to gauge its price stabilization performance: 
(1) Epi = (Li T/ Li P)(P1/Til) 







where E . refers to the price elasticity of tax i, T is the tax, P pl 
is price level, and subscript 1 stands for the initial period. 
The price stability of transfer payments will be evaluated in 
the ~allowing manner: 
(1) Ept = iiU/ iiP(P1/U1) > 1 destabilizing 
(2) Ept = 1:1U/ iiP(P1/U1) = 1 neutral 
(3) Ept = /:1 U/ Li P(P1Ju1) 1 stabilizing 
4 
< 
where Ept refers to the price elasticity of transfer payments and U is 
the transfer payments. The rest of the variables are as defined above. 
FOOTNOTES 
1The expression within the parenthesis is incorrectly written as 
(r1v1 - r2Y2) in Musgrave and Miller 1 s article. 
2Here again the expressions for the change in personal taxes, 
transfer payments and corporate taxes are incorrectly written as 
(r1v1 - r2Y2), (u1Y1 - u2v2) and (t1v1 - t 2Y2), respectively, 
in Eilbott 1 s article. 
3From a hypothetical point of view, however, any positive price 
elasticity of taxes will be stabilizing in the sense that inflation 
would have gotten worse had there been no increase in taxes at all 
due to an increase in prices. 
4This type of stabilization may not be desirable, however. Trans-
fer payments must at least rise proportionately to the rise in prices 
to maintain purchasing power of the recipients. 
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CHAPTER V 
DERIVATION, ADJUSTMENT AND CLASSIFICATION OF 
THE DATA 
Introduction 
Prior to using the data, much of it must be adjusted. The follow-
ing sections are devoted to a step by step explanation of the adjustment 
process. First, the data for taxes and transfer payments are discussed. 
Then, adjustment of the data for seasonal fluctuations, collection lags-
the lag between the period a particular tax is collected and when it is 
actually reported to the Treasury - and legislative rate changes, if. 
any, is considered. Finally, the different classifications of taxes 
and transfer payments are explained, 
Derivation of the Data 
The basic data for individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, 
federal excise taxes, social security taxes (Old-age and Survivors 
Disability Insurance Contributions) and benefits, and unemployment in-
surance contributions and benefits are derived in the following manner. 
Individual Income Tax 
The data consists of tax revenue collected through withholding. 
They represent the amount reported on quarterly tax returns received 
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each quarter. It would have been better to use total tax collections, 
withheld at source as well as non~withheld. But because most of it is 
paid in the first quarter of every year, the non-withheld portion cannot 
accurately be associated with particular quarters. The exclusion of 
non-withheld payments, which accounted for 24 percent of the total 
gross individual income tax payments in fiscal 1971 and 22 percent in 
fiscal year 1974, causes effectiveness of individual income tax as an 
automatic stabilizer to be underestimated. Withholdings collections 
represented as much as 89 percent of total net (after refunds) indivi-
dual income tax payments during fiscal year 1971 and 94 percent during 
fiscal year 1974 (17). 
Corporate Income Tax 
The data employed are that of the corporate profit tax liabilities 
and not the actual cash payments. Basically, the same argument as in 
the case of non-withheld part of the individual income tax payments, 
is valid here namely, the actual tax payments cannot be accurately 
attributed to the quarter during which these payments fell due. Fur-
thermore, it is assumed that the current tax liabilities weigh heavily 
in the decision making process of the corporations for investment plans 
and dividend payment policies. 
Federal Excise Taxes 
All federal excise tax collections are included in the data. 
Social Security Taxes 
The data include taxes for old-age and survivors insurance, disa-
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bility insurance, railroad retirement, minus social security taxes 
paid by the self-employed. In other words, OASDI contributions + 
railroad retirement contributions - social security taxes by the self-
employed make up the data for social security taxes for this study. 
Social security taxes by the selfemployed were subtracted from the 
total OASDI contributions for the same reason as that of the exclusion 
of non-withheld individual income tax payments. That is, they are not 
attributable to the appropriate quarter because most payments are made 
in the beginning of the following year. The omission is not serious 
since self-employment taxes accounted for only 5 percent of the total 
social security taxes during fiscal years 1971 and 1974 (17). To ob-
tain data for social security taxes by self-employed people, income tax 
not withheld which did not include self-employment tax was subtracted 
from income tax not withheld which did include tax on the self-employed. 
OASDI Benefit Payments 
The data consist of old-age and survivors insurance cash benefit 
payments plus payments from disability insurance trust funds plus rail-
road retirement benefits. Lump sum OASDHI payments are subtracted from 
the total because they are one time payments to the heirs of the insured 
person at the time of his/her death. Although disability insurance 
payments are not d1rectly related to the business conditions they are 
included in the data because these payments cannot be separated from 
the lump sum OASDHI payments which are deducted from the total and are 
also included on the contribution side of the OASDI account. These 
payments accounted for only 10 percent of the total OASDI benefits in 
the first quarter of 1966 and 14 percent in the first quarter of 
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1975 (57). 
Unemployment Insurance Contributions 
Contributions by the employers in the State Unemployment Insurance 
program are included in this category. Taxes paid by employers under 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and Railroad unemployment insurance 
contributions are not included. Payments under the federal unemployment 
taxes accounted for 15 percent of the total employers' contributions 
during fiscal year 1966 and 20 percent during fiscal year 1975 (58). 
For the most part, the payments are concentrated in the first quarter 
of the following year (at least until 1971); therefore, they cannot be 
attributed to the relevant quarter of the year. Payments under the 
railroad unemployment insurance have been consistently declining over 
the last decade. They were four percent of the total unemployment con-
tributions during fiscal year 1966 but dropped to less than two percent 
during fiscal year 1975 (58). 
Unemployment Benefit Payments 
The data consist of the payments made to the unemployed under 
state laws plus unemployment benefits to the railroad employees. Pay-
ments under the state laws include unemployment insurance for federal 
employees and for ex-servicemen; they also include payments under the 
Servicemens' Readjustment Act of 1944 and the Veterans• Readjustment 
Act of 1952 and those under federal temporary extended unemployment 
insurance programs of 1958 and 1961. 
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Adjustment of the Data 
The data, as discussed in the preceding section, are adjusted for 
seasonal fluctuations, collections lags and legislative rate changes, 
in that order. 
Adjustments for Seasonal Variations 
Taxes and transfer payments for a particular quarter may be influ-
enced by seasonal factors. Consequently, the data must be adjusted 
so as to eliminate the influence of these factors. Except for corporate 
tax liabilities, published on a seasonally adjusted basis, the data for 
all other taxes and transfer payments noted above are adjusted for 
seasonal fluctuations. 
An OLS (ordinary least squares) regression of the original series 
using dummy variables 'for each quarter, was run for each of the taxes 
and transfer payments. Specifically, the following equation was fitted 
to the data: 
where Y stands for the observed value of a particular tax or transfer 
payment; i is the number of the observation, and j refers to the parti-
cular tax or transfer payment item. o1, o2 and o3 are durrrny variables 
for first, second and third quarter respectively, so that 
o1 = 1, if the data refers to the first quarter, 
0, otherwise. 
D = 1, if the data refers to the second quarter, 2 
0, otherwise. 
65 
o3 = 1, if the data refers to the third quarter, 
0, otherwise. 
The coefficient for the fourth quarter is given by the values of the 
intercept, 80 . E stands for the residuals. 
Following G. S. Maddala (34), the mean of the original series is 
added to the residuals corresponding to each observation in order to 
obtain the seasonally adjusted values for the particular tax/transfer 
payment item. This can be expressed as follows: 
V. + E .. = 
J 1J 
seasonally adjusted value for the ith observation 
of the tax item, j. 
where VJ. is the mean of the series of tax or transfer item j and E .. 
1J 
is residual corresponding to ith observation from the regression 
equation of tax or transfer item j. 
Adjustments for Lags in Collection 
/ The data published in a particular quarter of the year actually 
indicates the time a certain tax revenue was received by the g.overnment. 
All the taxes are not reported inmediately to the Treasury after they 
have been collected from the taxpayers. Therefore, there is a time lag 
involved in case of certain taxes between the period to which a tax 
belonged and the period it is reported in the relevant Treasury docu-
ments. Unless proper adjustments are made, the data as reported on 
the basis of its' receipt by the treasury, may lead to erroneous con-
clusions due to the collection lag. These lags in collection, however, 




Data for individual income tax withholdings and unemployment con-
tributions are adjusted for the lags in collection as is explained later. 
In the case of corporate income tax, there is no need for adjustment 
for collection lag because the data used are that of liabilities and 
not the actual payments. There is no significant collection lag in 
the case of excise taxes because most of them are paid at the end of 
every month. Although social security taxes (OASDI contributions) 
are withheld at source by the employers and deposited with the treasury 
along with the individual income tax withholdings, their transfer to 
the trust funds from which the data have been derived may fluctuate 
depending on the position of the fund at various point~ in time. There-
fore, data for this category of taxes are not adjusted for collection 
lag. As far as OASDI benefits and unemployment :compensation payments 
are concerned, no adjustment for collection lag is involved. 
Following procedure was adopted to adjust the data for collection 
lags in individual income tax withholdings and unemployment insurance 
,contributions. 
Individual Income Tax Withholdings. The employers have to abide 
by the fo.llowing schedule in depositing with the treasury federal income 
tax and social security taxes withheld at source: 
1) When the liability for payroll taxes (federal income tax and 
social security taxes) for an employer is less than $200 for a 
quarter, total liability for the quarter has to be deposited 
by the last day of the following month or paid with quarterly 
returns. 
2) In case of the cumulative liability for payroll taxes 
being less than $200 at the end of the first month of 
the quarter but $200 or above at the end of the second 
month, it is to be deposited by the 15th of the third 
month. Third month 1s collections are deposited with the 
quarterly returns. 
3) If the total liability is $200 or above but less than 
$2,000 per month, deposits must be made for each of the 
first two months of the quarter on or before 15th of 
the next month. Third month 1s payments are to be made 
on or before the last day of the month following the 
quarter (63). 
The above schedule of payments results into a minimum of 15 days 
and a maximum of four months lag between the collection of taxes and 
their actual deposit with the treasury. 
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Lewis (32) estimated that approximately 90 percent of the with-
holdings in the first two months of each quarter, and 30 percent of 
the withholdings in the third month of the quarter are deposited in 
the treasury account by the end of the month following. This means 
that 60 percent of the total withholdings of a particular quarter are 
deposited and show up in treasury data in the same quarter while the 
remaining 40 percent will show in the following quarter 1 s figures of 
tax collections. 
The individual income tax withholdings as reported in the treasury 
data are adjusted for collection lag on the basis of the above esti-
mates. Accordingly, 60 percent of the seasonally adjusted withholdings 
of a given quarter are added to the 40 percent of the seasonally 
qdjusted collections of the following quarter to come up with the 
figure for the first of the two given quarters. For example, to 
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arrive at the values for the first quarter, 60 percent of the collec-
tions of the first quarter are added to the 40 percent of the collections 
of the second quarter. 
Unemployment Insurance Contributions. As stated in an earlier 
section of this chapter, the data include only the payments made by 
the employers to the state unemployment insurance program. The time 
of the actual payments would therefore, be regulated by state laws. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that generally a one quarter lag 
is involved between the time these payments fall due and presumably 
have their impact on the employers' decision making process, and the 
time they are actually paid and published in the relevant series. 
Therefore, for any given two quarters, seasonally adjusted values for 
the second quarter were related to the first quarter and so forth. 
Adjustment for Legislative Rate Changes 
Legislative changes in the rates of various taxes and transfer 
payments are made as and when needed to keep up with the changed cir-
cumstances. For the purposes of measuring the impact on the economy 
of automatic changes in taxes and transfer payment items, it is impor-
tant that the data employed should be free from the effects of any 
discretionary changes and show only the automatic changes due to the 
general economic activity. If the data used are not adjusted for rate 
changes the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers may be overesti-
mated. For example, if tax rates are reduced during a recession, the 
decline in tax revenues will be greater than what it would have been 
only as a result of a decline in incomes. But the unadjusted data 
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will inaccurately indicate a greater automatic flexibility. 
Government estimates of the effect on revenue and transfer pay-
ment expenditures of discretionary changes are used to adjust the rele-
vant data for cyclical peak and trough quarters only. Such estimates 
are published in the Budget of the United States and the Economic Re-
ports of the President. As pointed out by Auld such estimates have 
the advantage of including the adjustments for all factors affecting 
the tax revenue (2). 
Notable legislative changes during 1966-75 period were: (1) Ex-
penditure Control Act of 1968, enacted June 28, 1968, (2) Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, enacted December 1969, (3) Revenue Act of 1971, enacted 
December, 1971, and (4) Tax Reduction Act of 1975, enacted March 29, 
1975. In addition, social security tax rates and earnings base were 
increased. The scope of unemployment insurance benefits was extended 
in December, 1974 (a later amendment came in March, 1975). Social 
security benefit rates were increased in March, 1968, October, 1972, 
April, 14 and July; 1974. Excise tax on telephones was gradually 
reduced during this period. 
The estimates of the revenue effects of changes in the tax rates 
published in the relevant issues of the Budget are on a fiscal year 
basis. In order to come up with an approximate value of the revenue 
effects for a particular quarter, the following procedure was adopted: 
(1) Actual quarterly figures were added on a fiscal year basis. 
For example, to get actual tax collections during fiscal year 1970, 
tax collections reported for third quarter 1969 through second quarter 
1970 are added. 1 
(2) Actual tax collections of a given quarter are divided by 
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the total collections of the fiscal year as obtained at step 1 above. 
This gives the share of that quarter's collections in the total. For 
example, actual total collections of individual income tax withholdings 
during fiscal year 1970 were $77,410 million. Collections for the third 
quarter which was the peak quarter, were $18,967 million. Dividing 
$18,967 through $77,410 gives 0.245, which means that the actual tax 
collections during third quarter 1969 were 24.5 percent of the total 
collections for fiscal year 1970. 
(3) Fiscal year estimates of revenue effects of a rate change 
·are multiplied by the share of the given quarter in the total. The 
resultant figure is the approximate effect of the rate change during 
that particular quarter. Continuing with our previous example, it was 
estimated by the government that individual income tax will increase 
by $7,200 million during· fiscal year 1970 due to the 10 percent sur-
charge levied under the Expenditure Control Act of 1968. $7,200 mil-
lion was multiplied by 0.245, the share of the third quarter found at 
step 2 above, giving a value of $1,764 million for the effect of a rate 
change during that quarter. 
(4) Finally, the values of the effect of a rate change during a 
given quarter, found at step 3 are added or subtracted, as the case 
may be, to the corresponding values for that quarter after they have 
been adjusted for seasonal fluctuations and collection lag, if any. 
In the cases where a legislative change resulted in an increase in 
tax revenue, the values for the effect of that increase for a given 
quarter will be subtracted from the values of that quarter to eliminate 
the effects of legislative changes. The opposite is done when legis-
lative actions resulted in a decline in taxes. 
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Where the estimates of the legislative changes are given on calen-
dar year basis, which is particularly true in the case of estimates 
of transfer payment changes reported in the Economic Report of the Pre-
sident, actual quarterly values in a calendar year are added. The ob-
served values of a peak or trough quarter are then divided by the total 
for that year to determine the share of that quarter in the year's total. 
The rest of the procedure is identical to that of step 3 and 4 above. 
The details of the adjustment of the data for legislative rate 
changes is given for each cyclical peak and trough quarter in Table I. 
Classification of the Data 
After making necessary adjustments for seasonal fluctuations, 
collection lag and legislative rate changes, the data for taxes and 
transfer payments are classified into three main categories: personal 
taxes, corporate taxes, and transfer payments. 
Personal Taxes 
Individual income tax withholdings, federal excise taxes (treating 
them as personal taxes assessed on an expenditure basis) and employee 
share of the old-age and survivors• disability insurance (OASDI) contri-
butions excluding contributions by the self-employed but including 
railroad retirement contributions, were combined together and are 
referred to as personal taxes. Data for the employee share of the 
OASDI contributions were estimated by dividing the total OASDI contri-

















ADJUSTMENTS FOR LEGISLATIVE.RATE CHANGES IN VARIOUS TAXES 
AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS DURING 1966-75 
(In Million Dollars) 
Amount Fi sea 1 /Calendar Share of the Type of Change Govt. estimates 
(after making Year Total particular of revenue/expendi-
adjustments for quarter in the ture effects for 
seasona 1 fl uctua- yearly total the fiscal/calendar 
tions and co11ec- year 
tion lags~ where 
applicable) 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
~re Control Act of 1968 
June 28, 1968) · 
$19, 772 $ 77,410 24.Sl (i) 10% tax surcharge + $7 ,200 
(fiscal) 
$38,900 $147 ,800 26.3l (ii) -do- + $1 ,800 
(annual rate) (fiscal) 
Repeal of investment + $ 500 
tax credit (calendar) 
(effective April 21, 1969) 
$ 3 ,828 $ 15,706 25.3% (iii) Deferring of a scheduled + $2, 100 
reduction in automobile (7% to 5%) (fiscal) 
telephone (10% to 5%) excise 
taxes until Jan. l, 1970. 
$ 7 ,943 $ 33,070 25.6% (iv) Increase in social security tax + $3,000 
rates from 8.8% to 9.6% on (fiscal) 
Jan. 1, 1969 
$ 7 ,226 $ 30,323 23.0% Liberalization of Social security + $3,000 
benefits (effective March, 1968) (for calendar 1968) 
(major part of $5 bil-








+ $ 473.7 
+ $ 163.8 
+ $ 531.7 
+ $ 767 
+ $ 750 












$ 3 ,296 
$ 7,176 




Period Budget Item Amount Fiscal/Calendar Share of the 
(after making Vear Total particular 
adjustments for quarter in the 
seasonal fluctua- yearly tota 1 
tions and collec-
ti on 1 ags ~ where a 
applicable) 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1970 IV Individual $19,340 $ 76 ,484 24% 
Income Tax 
Corporate $33,000 $143,700 23% 
Income Tax (annual rate) 
Excise Tax $ 3,961 $ 16,615 24.8% 
Social Security $ 8 ,929 $ 33,322 26% 
Benefits 
(CONTINUED) 
Type of Change Govt. estimates 
of revenue/expend!-




Tax Reform Act of 1969 
{Dec. , 1969) 
(i) Extension of income tax surcharge + $ 400 
at 5% rate from Jan. 1 to June 30, {fiscal) 
1970 
) 
(ii) Repeal of investment tax credit + $ 600 
(fiscal) 
(ii;) Extension of income tax surcharge + $ 700 
at 5'.t rate from Jan. 1 to June 30, {fiscal) 
1970 
(iv) Repeal of investment tax credit + $1,900 ) 
{flscal) 
(v) Tax reform and relief provisions + $ 900 
(fiscal) 
(vi) Extension of excise tax rates to + $1,200 
Dec. 31, 1970 (fiscal) 








+ $ 242 
+ $ 803.75 












$ 3 ,663 
$ 7 ,915 
-....J 
w 
TABLE I (CONTINUED) 
Period Budget Item Amount Fiscal/Calendar Share of the Type of Change 
(after making Year Total particular 
adjustments for quarter in the 
seasonal fluctua- yearly tota 1 
tions and collec-
tion lags, where 
applicable) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revenue Act of 1971 
(Dec., 1971) 
1973 IV Individual $28,013 $112,064 24.5% (i) Increased exemptions 
Income Tax {ii) Increased deductions 
{iii) Job development credit 
{iv) Revision of accelerated 
depreciation 
(v) Correct ion of wi thho 1 ding 
schedules 
Corporate Income $48,600 $198,000 24.5% (vi) Job development credit 
Tax (Annual Rate) (vii) Revision of accelerated 
depreciation 
(viii) Tax deferra 1 for certa 1 n 
corporations engaged 
in foreign trade 
Excise Tax $ 4 ,387 $ 16,844 27% Reduction in telephone 
excise (10% to 9% on 
January 1, 1973) 
Repeal of auto and 
sma 11 truck excises 
{Revenue Act of 1971) 
Govt. estimates 
of revenue/expendi-




















































seasona 1 fl uctua-
tions and collec-










$ 53 ,696 
$ 5,213 
TABLE I (CONTINUED) 
Share of the Type of Change 
particular 






Rate increase from 
9.6% to 10. 5% effective 
January 1, 1971 +3,800 
(fiscal 1973) 
Taxable earnin~s base 
increase from $7 ,800 to 
$9,000 effective Jan. 1, 
1972 
Rate increase from 10.4% 
to 11.7% effective 
+3,600 
Jan. 1, 1973 +6,800 
Taxable earnings base 
increase $9 ,000 to 
$10,800 effective 
Jan. 1, 1973 





















































sea sona 1 fl uctua-
ti ons and co 11 ec-


















Share of the Type of Change 
particular 








Tax Reduction Act of 1975 
(March 29, 1975) 
(i) Decrease in tax 
Reduction in telephone excise tax 
9% to 8% fr001 Jan. 1, 1974 
8% to 7% fr001 Jan. 1. 1975· 
'Ea,rnings base increase 
$Hi,800 to $13,200 
effective Jan. 1, 1974; +$4,800 
From $13,200 to $14, 100 
effective Jan. 1, 1975 +$ 100 
Increase in benefit rates. 7% in 
April and additional 4% in July, 
1974 (Total 11%) 
Unemployment benefit increase 
Govt. estimates 
of revenue/expendi-

































(11% of total bene- $14,795 
fits of the quarter) 
+$ 500 $ 2,746 
Sources: U. S. Budgets 1970, p. 61-62; 1971, p. 67; 1973, p. 66-67; 1974, p. 62, 76; 1975, p. 46; 1976, p. 59; 1977, p. 51; G•,neral Explanation of Tax Reform Act of 1969, p. 27; Economic Reports of the Presi-





Corporate income tax liabilities, one-half of total OASDI contri-
butions and unemployment contributions are included in this group of 
taxes. 
Transfer Payments 
OASDI benefit payments and unemployment benefits are summed and 
called transfer payments. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Prior to 1976, the fiscal year ended on June 30th. It now ends 
on September 30th. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MEASUREMENT AND FINDINGS OF OUTPUT AND 
PRICE STABILITY 
Introduction 
In this chapter the data, after having been adjusted for seasonal 
variations, collection lags and legislative rate changes are subjected 
to the detailed analysis of the type suggested by the model in Chapter 
IV. The results for each of the two cyclical upturns and downturns 
are noted. 
It may be recalled that the measure of the effectiveness of auto-
matic fiscal stabilizers is split into output and price stabilization 
effects. Analysis with respect to output stabilization will be taken 
up first followed by the evaluation of the price stabilization aspect 
of the automatic stabilizers. 
Measurement of Output Stability 
While evaluating the output stabilization performance of the auto-
matic stabilizers, the effects of movements in the price level, have to 
be eliminated from the data. Therefore, as a first step, all the rele-
vant data belonging to cyclical peak and trough quqrters are converted 
into constant (1958) dollars. This includes data for national income, 
individual income tax withholding collections, excise taxes, social 
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security taxes, corporate income tax liabilities, unemployment insurance 
contributions, social security benefits and unemployment compensation 
payments. The data for taxes and transfer payments are then arranged 
under the three main categories of personal taxes, corporate taxes, and 
transfer payments as explained at the end of the preceding chapter. 
Current dollar values for corporate profits with inventory and capital 
consumption adjustment, dividends, and employer contribution for social 
insurance are also converted into constant dollars because they are 
later · used for deriving the corporate share of national income. GNP 
implicit price deflator (1958 = 100) is used for this purpose. 
As a second step, personal and corporate shares of national income 
are derived for each of the peak and trough quarter falling within the 
period of the study. It may be recalled that the corporate share, Z, 
has been defined in Chapter IV as: 
Z = corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital 
consumption adjustment minus dividends plus employer 
contributions for social insurance. 
Personal share, X, would therefore be equal to Y - Z. 
Third, absolute changes in the real values of national income, 
personal and corporate shares of national income, personal taxes, 
corporate taxes and transfer payments from peak to trough and vice 
versa falling within the period (1966 I - 1975 I) covered by the study, 
were computed. While computing changes in taxes and transfer payments 
during cyclical expansions and contractions, the data used for the 
ending quarter are adjusted for discretionary rate changes, if any, 
during that cycle to make it comparable with the initial quarter 
figures. But when the same quarter is representing the initial quarter 
of the following cycle, the data used are not adjusted for discretion-
ary rate changes since such a comparison is not affected by the rate 
changes in the preceding cycle. This is so because we are interested 
in the changes that occurred during a particular expansion or contrac-
tion under a constant rate structure. Therefore, to make the data 
for the initial and the terminal quarter comparable, the only values 
that need to be adjusted for rate changes are those of the ending 
quarter so that they represent the rate structure prevailing at the 
beginning of the cycle. 
Fourth, the ratios fJ. XI fJ. Y, fl Z/b. Y and average rates of personal 
taxes R/Y, corporate taxes, T/Y and transfer payments U/Y are derived 
for each eye le. 
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Fifth, output elasticities of personal taxes, corporate taxes 
and transfer payments are computed for each of the two upturns and 
downturns. This is done by evaluating the ratio of percentage changes 
in real taxes/tranfers to the percentage changes in real national 
income for each period. 
Thus far, all the ingredients of the formula (equation 23 in 
Chapter IV) for measuring the degree of effectiveness of output stabi-
1 izers have been determined except for the values of marginal propen-
sity to consume, c and marginal propensity to invest, i. A set of the 
values for c and i are employed in order to allow the results a 
broader applicability. 
The final step is to combine the derived values of average rates 
of taxes/transfer payments, output elasticities and the ratios IJ.X/ 6. Y 
and fJ. Z/ fJ. Y with each pair of the assumed values for c and i in the man-
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ner indicated by equation 23 in Chapter IV. This is done for each of 
the two expansionary (one complete and part of the other expansion) and 
contractionary periods covered in the study. The resultant figures 
indicated that the automatic fiscal stabilizers as a group, were capable 
of preventing that much of a percentage of change in national income 
over the relevant period. 
In order to ascertain the effectiveness of any single stabilizer 
while other stabilizers are assumed constant, the derived values of 
its 1 average rates, output elasticity and the ratios /J. X//J. Y and /J. l.,/!J. Y 
were combined with different sets of the assumed values for c and i as 
indicated by equations 24 through 26. Again, this was done separately 
for each of the four periods covered in the study. The results obtained 
gave the degree of potential effectiveness of a single stabilizer in 
preventing the changes in national income. The words 1 potential effec-
tiveness' are used because this will be achievable only if rest of the 
stabilizers are inactive, which means that a part of the would be in-
fluence of other stabilizers on income will be captured by the particu-
lar stabilizer befng evaluated. Therefore, potential effectiveness 
will tend to be greater than the actual. This point has also been 
stressed by Ruggeri (42). 
Measurement of Price Stability 
As mentioned earlier, this aspect of automatic stabilizers is 
concerned with looking into the contribution of automatic stabilizers 
toward the stability of general price level. By the very nature of 
the problem involved here, all the relevant data for national income, 
taxes and transfer payments, etc. is in current dollars indicating 
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that the price level is allowed to change. 
Percentage changes in the general price level (using GNP implicit 
price deflator as an index) and in the current dollar values of personal 
taxes, corporate taxes and transfer payments from peak to trough quar-
ters and vice versa of each sub-period are derived. These percentage 
changes are then used to compute price elasticities of all the three 
major categories of automatic stabilizers. As noted in Chapter II, a 
particular tax item with a price elasticity of greater than unity 
works to stabilize prices. A unitary price elasticity indicates its 
neutrality so far as price stabilization is concerned and an elasticity 
of less than one means that the stabilizer in question was acting as 
a price destabilizer. In the case of transfer payments, a price elas-
ticity of less than one is consistant with price stabilization whereas 
an elasticity of greater than one will indicate that these payments 
were price destabilizing. A price elasticity equal to one will show 
neutral effects. 
Results 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the present study covered the period 
from 1st quarter 1966 through 1st quarter 1975 which was further split 
into four sub-periods according to the peaks and troughs of economic 
activity. The results obtained for each of these four periods are 
presented in a chronological order. 
1966 (I) - 1969 (III) Expansion 
It should be mentioned here once again that this period is part of 
a long expansion that started in early 1961 and continued until the 
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third quarter of 1969. An inflationary situation prevailed during this 
period as there was considerable increase in the general price level. 
Price level rose by as much as 15 percent. While national income in 
current dollars showed an increase of 171.4 billion, it was only $63.1 
billion when converted into constant (1958) dollars (Table II). 
Assuming values for the marginal propensity to consume and invest of 
0.9 (21 )(22)(18) and 0.5 (15)(16)(14) respectively, it is estimated that 
as much as 78 percent of the potential increase in real output was pre-
vented by the automatic stabilizers. The effectiveness of output stabi-
lizers is reduced to 55 percent if the values for MPC and MPI are assumed 
to be 0.8 and 0.3 respectively. Thus the output stabilizers, as a whole, 
prevented from 55 to 78 percent of the potential increase in output 
(Table III). 
As far as the effectiveness of a single category of stabilizers 
i-s concerned, only personal taxes were contributing significantly to 
the output stability. Real personal taxes increased by $18.5 billion 
during this period, which amounted to a 2.69 percent increase in taxes 
for every one percent increase in output. It is estimated that from 61 
to 81 percent of the potential increase in output was prevented automa-
tically by personal taxes. Very little contribution to the output sta-
bility was made by the corporate taxes because they did not increase much 
during this period. The output elasticity of corporate taxes was only 
0.35~ On the other hand, transfer payments were adding to the expansion-
ary forces rather than checking them. These payments registered an in-
crease of $4.4 billion in constant (1958) dollars during 1966 (I) - 1969 
(III) period (Table II). It should be mentioned here once again that 
the effectiveness of individual stabilizers refers to their potential 
TABLE II 
ABSOLUTE AND PERCENT CHANGES IN MJl.TIONAL IMCOMF. /l.ND THE AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS l 
19661-19691 l l l9691II-1970IV 19701V-19731V 19731V-1975I 
Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent 
Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change 
1. National Income: 
i ) current dollars 171.40 0.28 31.70 0.04 296.40 0.36 47.0 0.04 
i i ) constant dollars 63.10 0. ll 7 -15.02 -0.025 109.00 0.18 -60.8 -0.08 
2. Personal Taxes: 
2 
i) current dollars 33.71 0. 51 5.61 0.05 42.64 0.39 9.68 0.06 
ii ) constant dollars 18. 51 0. 31 - 1.00 -0.013 16. 17 0.20 - 6.93 -0. 07 
3. Corporate Taxes: 3 
i ) current dollars 8.81 0. 19 - 5. 19 -0.09 19.00 0.37 - 1.83 -0.025 
ii ) constant dollars 1.64 0.04 - 6.49 -0. 15 6.84 0.18 - 7.25 -0 .158 
4. Transfer Payments: 
4 
i ) current dollars 8.69 0.43 5.46 0. 19 11. 24 0.30 9.28 0. 17 
ii) constant dollars 4.40 0.24 2.40 0. 107 3. 10 0.11 0.33 0. 01 
5. Price Level 16. 75 0.15 8.74 . 0.06 21.05 0 .15 22.69 0.14 
1changes in automatic stabilizers are those occurred automatically, i.e., after adjusting for legislative rate changes. 
The data are seasonally adjusted at annual rates in billions of current and constant (1958) dollars. 
2Personal taxes included individual income tax withholding collections, excise taxes, and one-half of old age survivors 
and disability insurance contributions. 
3corporate taxes included corporate income tax liabilities, one-half of OASDI contributions and unemployment contri-
butions. 
4rransfer payments include unemployment compensation payments and OASDI benefits payments. 








i) personal taxes 
ii) corporate taxes 
iii) transfer payments 
Price Elasticity: 
i) personal taxes 
ii) corporate taxes 
iii) transfer payments 
Effectiveness (a) with 
different sets of 







OUTPUT AND PRICE ELASTICITY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS, 1966-1975 
19661-1969111 19691II-l9701V 1970IV-1973IV 
Expansion Contraction Expansion 
2.69 0.52 1.10 
0.35 6.24 0.90 
2.08 -4.28 0.61 
3.43 0.83 2.56 
1.32 -1.43 2.46 
2.88 2.79 1.97 
0.78 0.48 0.42 
0.84 0.35 0.35 
0.53 0.46 0.32 













SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletins, Survey of Current Business, Social Security Bulletins and Annual 




and not the actual effectiveness. This means that by whatever percen-
tage of the change in national income they were capable of preventing 
would be possible only if rest of the stabilizers were not there. But 
since rest of the stabilizers do affect consumption and income, some of 
these influences will show up in the performance of the active stabili-
zer. In short, the actual effectiveness of a stabilizer will be smaller 
than its potential one. 
Personal taxes were also the major contributors with respect to 
price stability. The price elasticity of personal taxes was 3.43 during 
this period which indicates that these taxes increased at a much faster 
rate than the rate of increase in the price level. Corporate taxes also 
increased in a greater proportion than prices and were therefore, check-
ing the inflationary forces. The price elasticity of corporate taxes 
was 1.32. Transfer payments were destabilizing with respect to price 
stability as they were in the case of output stability. Price elasti-
city of transfer payments was 2.88 during this period {Table III). 
1969 {III) - 1970 {IV) Contraction 
The expansion that had started in 1961 peaked out in the third 
quarter 1969. This was followed by a mild recession which lasted 
until fourth quarter 1970. This period, however, did not register a 
consistent decline in real national income. Real national income 
started declining in the last quarter 1969 and continued this trend 
through the second quarter 1970. It picked up a little in third 
quarter 1970 but dropped again in the last quarter of 1970. While 
real output declined by as much as $15 billion during this period, the 
price level increased by six percent (Table II). Thus, the economy 
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experienced declining output and rising prices during this recession. 
The automatic stabilizers, as a group, contributed significantly 
to stabilize output. The combination of the values for the marginal 
propensity to consume and invest of 0.9 and 0.5, respectively, yielded 
an estimate of 48 percent for the effectiveness of output stabilizers. 
When the values of 0.8 for MPC and 0.3 for MPI were assigned to these 
. . 
parameters, the effectiveness of automatic output stabilizers was re-
duced to 33 percent (Table II I). 
Individually, corporate taxes and transfer payments were the 
leading output stabilizers. Their range of potential effectiveness 
was from 17 to 32 percent and 17 to 24 percent respectively during 
the period under discussion. Personal taxes could only prevent from 
8 to 12 percent of a change in national income {Table IV). During 
recessions profits fall off more relative to the decline in individual 
incomes. Therefore, a greater change in corporate taxes results in 
their being more effective. 
All the three major categories of automatic stabilizers were behav-
ing in a destabilizing manner with regard to the price stability. Al-
though personal taxes, in money terms, increased five percent it was -
less than the six percent increase in the price level. Corporate taxes, 
in current dollars, moved in the opposite. direction to prices and hence 
contributed to inflation. Nominal transfer payments increased 19 per-
cent which was three times as much of the increase in price level and 
therefore, also added to the inflationary forces (Table II). 
1970 (IV) - 1973 (IV) Expansion 
During this period of economic expansion, from the fourth quarter 
TABLE IV 
POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL AUTOMATIC 




Propensity Propensity Effectiveness 
Period To Consume To Invest (a)' 
1966I-1969III Expansion 
Personal Taxes 0.9 0.5 0.81 0.8 0.3 0.61 
Corporate Taxes 0.9 0.5 0.18 0.8 0.3 0.05 
Transfer Payments 0.9 0.5 
____ l 
0.8 0.3 -0.59 
1969III-1970IV Contraction 
Personal Taxes 0.9 0.5 o. 12 0.8 0.3 0.08 
Corporate Taxes 0.9 0.5 0.32 0.8 0.3 0. 17 
Transfer Payments 0.9 0.5 0.24 0.8 0.3 0. 17 
1970IV-1973IV Expansion 
Personal Taxes 0.9 0.5 0.41 0.8 0.3 0.27 
Corporate Taxes 0.9 0.5 0.14 0.8 0.3 0.06 
Transfer Payments 0.9 0.5 -0.16 0.8 0.3 -0.08 
l973IV-1975I Contraction 
Personal Taxes 0.9 0.5 0.29• 0.8 0.3 0.19 
Corporate Taxes 0.9 0.5 0. 19 0.8 0.3 0.08 
Transfer Payments 0.9 0.5 0.02 0.8 0.3 0.01 
1The effectiveness of transfer payments is not reported here be-
cause an unbelievable coefficient of stability for transfer payments 
was calculated. This was primarily the result of a decline in the cor-
porate share in national income during the expansion which in turn pro-
duce9 the anomaly. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletins, Survey of Current Business, 
Social Security Bulletins and Annual Reports of the 
Treasury. 
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1970 through fourth quarter 1973, national income in constant (1958) 
dollars registered an absolute increase of $109 billion. This trans-
lates into an increase of 18 percent over the entire expansion. The 
increase in the price level was 15 percent, which is the same increase 
that occurred during 1966-69 part of an earlier expansion. But because 
of the greater percentage increase in nominal national income, 36 per-
cent as against 28 percent during 1966-69, substantial gains in real 
output were recorded during 1970-73 expansion (Table II). 
During this period, all the output stabilizers together are esti-
mated to have prevented from 27 to 42 percent of the change in national 
income (Table III). As far as their individual performance is con-
cerned, personal taxes were the major stabilizers with a potential 
effectiveness ranging from 27 to 41 percent. Although their potential 
effectiveness was much less, 6 to 14 percent, than that of the personal 
taxes, corporate taxes also moved in the direction of stabilizing out-
put. As was the case in 1966-69 expansion, transfer payments again 
were destabilizing (Table IV). 
Evidently, output stabilizers were not as effective as was the 
case in the 1966-69 period. Real national income during 1970-73 period 
increased at a higher rate, 18 percent as compared to that of 11.7 per-
cent increase during 1966-69. The impact of the increase in taxes dur-
ing the latter period was greater than that of the former because 
considerable amount of the rise in incomes during 1966-69 was due to 
inflation. This may partly explain the rather mild contribution of 
automatic stabilizers during 1970-73 expansion. This may not be unde-
sirable during expansions if achieving full employment is the primary 
consideration. 
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Both personal taxes and corporate taxes rose in greater proportion 
than the rise in price level. Thus, real taxes increased and contribut-
ed to the price stability during 1970-73 period. It should be pointed 
out that part of the price stability can be attributed to the wage and 
price controls which were in effect during this period. Personal taxes 
automatically rose by as much as 39 percent. Corporate taxes registered 
an increase of 37 percent during the period. Since the increase in 
price level was 15 percent, less than 50 percent of the increase in 
taxes, both the personal and corporate taxes were acting as price sta-
bilizers. Transfer payments moved in the direction of destabilizing 
prices as they did in the case of output stabilization. These payments 
increased as much as 30 percent, in current dollars, between the peak 
to trough quarters of this expansion (Table II). This, being double 
the increase in price level, added to the inflationary forces. The 
price elasticity of transfer payments was l .97 (Table III). It should 
be mentioned however, that unemployment compensation payments decreased 
during this period. It was the increase in OASDI benefits which more 
than offset the decrease in unemployment compensation. 
1973 (IV) - 1975 (I) Contraction 
This was the per'iod which, more than anything else, prompted the 
evaluation of automatic fiscal stabilizers in terms of both price and 
output changes. As was the case in 1969-70 recession, the economy 
experienced rising prices and falling output during 1973-75. Real out-
put declined by $60.8 billion or eight percent while the price level in-
creased by 14 percent during this period (Table II). Stabilizers were 
subjected to opposing effects by rising prices and falling output. 
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The automatic stabilizers as a group, were operating to stabilize 
output. In other words, they were behaving in such a manner that slowed 
down the decline in real output. It is estimated that from 33 to 39 
percent of the decline in potential output was prevented due to the 
operation of the stabilizers (Table III). Considering a single category 
of automatic stabilizers at a time, it is estimated that personal taxes 
alone were capable of preventing from 19 to 29 percent of the potential 
decline in output. Corporate taxes could have been effective in off-
setting from 8 to 19 percent of the decline in output during the same 
period (Table IV). Because of the higher rate of inflation, the decline 
in corporate taxes was much less than that of 1969-70 period. This may 
explain the relatively lesser effectiveness of corporate taxes as 
automatic stabilizers. There was a slight automatic increase in trans-
fer payments ($0.33 billion) and hence they were largely neutral so far 
as output stabilization is concerned. 
As was the case in 1969-70 recession, the automatic stabilizers 
were destabilizing in respect to price changes during 1973-75 recession. 
Although personal taxes, in current dollars, increased by $9.68 billion 
or six percent between the peak and trough quarters of the recession, 
they did not keep pace with the 14 percent rise in the price level. 
Price elastici~ of personal taxe~ was .0.44. Corporate taxes decreased 
by 2.5 percent while transfer payments increased 17.6 percent and hence, 
both these budget items were price destabilizing (Table II). 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The automatic fiscal stabilizers consist of those taxes and trans-
fer payments which change automatically in response to changes in the 
national income. For example, taxes increase with the rise in incomes 
while transfer payments decrease during an economic expansion. During 
recession, however, as incomes decline so do the taxes, while transfer 
payments rise. The effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilizers is, 
in a simpler language, the contribution of these stabilizers in reduc-
ing the percentage changes in national income. 
The budget items considered as such in this study are the indivi-
dual income tax, corporate income tax, social security taxes, unemploy-
ment insurance contributions, federal excise taxes and transfer pay-
ments. Transfer payments include social security and unemployment 
benefit payments. These were later classified into three major cate-
gories of personal taxes, corporate taxes, and transfer payments. Per-
sonal taxes included individual income tax withholdings, excise taxes 
(assuming they were assessed on an expenditure basis) and one-half of 
social security taxes. Corporate taxes comprised of corporate profit 
tax liabilities, one-half of the social security taxes, and unemploy-
ment insurance contributions. Transfer payments included social secur-
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ity benefits and unemployment compensation payments. 
Since the period studied , 1966 (I) 1975 (I), is that of gener-
ally rising prices, even when output was falling, the contribution of 
stabilizers has been tested both from the point of view of output and 
price stability. 
The data for taxes and transfer payments were adjusted for sea-
sonal variations, lags involved in collection and reporting to the 
treasury, and legislative changes enacted in the various tax and trans-
fer payment rates. The last type of adjustment was necessitated by 
the purpose of this study which was to consider only the automatic, 
and not discretionary, changes in taxes ~nd transfer payments. Treasury 
estimates were used in making such adjustments. 
A static multiplier approach was used to measure the output stabi-
lity of the automatic stabilizers.While doing this, all the relevant 
data were converted in constant 1958 dollars. This was essential to 
ascertain the movements in real values of these variables. Price elas-
ticity of taxes and transfer payments were computed to determine whether 
a particular budget item was price stabilizer or destabilizer. 
The effectiveness of all the automatic fiscal stabilizers together 
was evaluated followed by the testing of the individual performance of 
each of the. three major categories. The results indicated that the 
stabilizers as a group, were moving in the direction of stabilizing 
output both during expansions as well as contractions. They were highly 
effective during 1966-69 part of the expansion in that from 55 to 78 
percent of the increase in income was prevented due to the operation 
of the stabilizers. During the inflationary expansions people move 
into higher income brackets subjecting themselves to higher tax rates. 
Not only that, taxes rise because of gains in real incomes but infla-
tionary gains in incomes also result in higher taxes. This explains 
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the stabilizers being more effective during 1966-69 part of the expan-
sion. In the following recession of 1969-70, 33 to 48 percent of the 
decline in output was offset by the automatic stabilizers. During 
1970-73 expansion, the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers was in 
a range of 27 to 42 percent of the rise in output. The smallest con-
tribution of automatic stabilizers was estimated for 1973-75 contrac-
tion. During the recessions accompanied with rising price level, nomi-
nal incomes do not fall as much as they would in the case of constant 
or declining price level, the decline in taxes and the rise in trans-
fer payments is smaller. For this reason, the role of automatic 
stabilizers is restricted. From 33 to 39 percent of the potential 
decline in national income was prevented by the stabilizers during 1973-
75 contraction. On th~ average, then, the automatic fiscal stabilizers 
were responsible for preventing from 37 to 52 percent of the potential 
change in national income during 1966 (I) - 1975 (I) period. 
Except for the 1969-70 recession, personal taxes were the single 
major contributing factor to the output stability during 1966-75 period, 
followed by the corporate taxes. During 1969-70 contraction, corpor-
ate taxes and transfer payments provided most of the output stability. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the decline in corporate profits 
during economic recessions is greater than the decline in the incomes 
of individuals. Therefore, a greater change in corporate taxes makes 
this item more effective as an automatic stabilizer. During 1973-75 
recession, however, the decline in corporate taxes was less compared 
to that of 1969-70 recession because of higher rate of inflation. 
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This explains the smaller contribution of corporate taxes toward econo-
mic stability during 1973-75 period. Transfer payments were output 
destabilizing during both the 1966-69 and 1970-73 expansionary periods. 
These payments were more or less neutral with regard to output stability 
during 1973-75 recession. High rate of inflation (14 percent) kept the 
transfer payments from rising significantly in real terms during this 
period and hence their effectiveness as a stabilizer was neutralized. 
Regarding the performance of the automatic stabilizers in respect 
to price stability, the results indicated that both personal taxes and 
corporate taxes were behaving in a manner so as to stabilize prices 
during expansionary periods of 1966-69 and 1970-73. On the other hand, 
transfer payments were moving in a direction that was price destabiliz-
ing. During two recessionary periods of rising prices and falling out-
put ( 1969-70 and 1973-75), however, a 11 three categories, personal 
taxes, corporate taxes and transfer payments were price destabilizing. 
Conclusions 
During the periods of stagflation - a situation of falling output 
and rising prices - it becomes important to look at the effects of the 
automatic fiscal stabilizers on output and prices. When output is 
falling we would expect taxes to fall and transfer payments to rise 
in order to contain further downward trends in the economy by means 
of maintaining consumption expenditures. But when prices are rising 
simultaneously, any decline in taxes and rise in transfer payments 
will add to the inflationary forces. In a situation like this, auto-
matic fiscal stabilizers cannot stabilize both output and prices. 
Therefore, automatic fiscal policy faces a dilerrma. Letting stabili-
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zers free to operate so as to check the decline in output strengthens 
the inflationary forces. That is exactly what happened furing the re-
cessions of 1969-70 and 1973-75, when price level was rising. As 
noted in the preceding sectiori, the automatic stabilizers in general, 
behaved to stabilize output but they were acting as price destabili-
zers during these periods. 
On the other hand, during periods of economic expansion automatic 
fiscal stabilizers stabilize both output and prices. They are much 
more effective on both fronts, especially during periods of near full 
employment and inflation when a considerable part of the increase in 
national income is due to rising prices. During one such period covered 
in this study, 1966-69, 55 to 78 percent of the potential increase 
in national income was offset by the automatic fiscal stabilizers. 
There were variations in the stabilizing impact of individual 
fiscal stabilizers. Personal taxes were the most effective output as 
well as price stabilizers during both expansions and the most effective 
output stabilizers during one of the two recessions which experienced 
the rising price level. As a matter of fact, a major share of the 
output stability during the inflationary period (1966-69) is provided 
by the personal taxes. It may be concluded then that personal taxes, 
in general, are the most important automatic ffscal stabilizers today. 
Corporate taxes are second in importance as a tool for automatic output 
and price stabilization policy during economic expansions. Transfer 
payments having increased during both, of the expansionary periods were 
destabilizing both prices and output. During the mild recession of 
1969-70, however, these payments were stabilizing output but were almost 
neutral during the more severe recession of 1973-75. Transfer payments 
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have understandably been on the rise even during economic expansions 
perhaps because of the greater coverage and more and more people becom-
ing eligible. The role of these payments is considerably depressed 
by rising prices during such recessions when the general price level 
is rising. Personal taxes were also the leading output stabilizers 
during the more severe recession of 1973-75. It should be pointed out 
that social security benefits have been indexed starting June, 1975. 
Benefit payments will automatically go up as the cost of living in-
creases (47) (59). Therefore, a rise in the price level during any 
future recession may not dampen the real increase in benefits. But 
since social security benefits are not very powerful automatic stabili-
zers, the degree of effectiveness of all the stabilizers may increase 
only slightly during such recessions. 
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that 
the automatic fiscal stabilizers are relatively more effective as 
output and price stabilizers during the economic expansions when consi-
derable amount of the increase in income is due to the rising prices. 
On the other hand, they are less effective as output stabilizers and 
move in the direction of destabilizing prices during the recessions 
which are characterized ·by rising prices and falling output. Personal 
taxes are the most important as stabilizers followed by the corporate 
taxes and transfer payments in that order. 
Automatic fiscal stabilizers are expected to check a good part 
of the expansionary forces during inflationary periods. However, they 
will not solve the problem of inflation completely. It is also argued 
that the automatic stabilizers have the disadvantage of slowing down 
the rate of growth in the economy. A policy of holding tax rates and 
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expenditure programs unchanged will result in a rising surplus at a 
full employment level of income because of an automatic increase in 
revenues. This will lead to a drag on the economy (27) (37). There-
fore, automatic stabilizers may or may not be desirable. This depends, 
however, on whether or not slowing down of growth in a certain year is 
crucial for the overall economic stability. It may be desirable to 
check extreme booms in order to keep the economy on the track. Auto-
matic stabilizers do help achieve that.objective. During such economic 
recessions when output is falling and prices rising, the stabilizers 
will provide some stability by moving in the direction of reducing the 
decline in output but will also aggravate the inflationary situation 
at the same time. 
Comparison with the Results of Some of the 
Earlier Studies 
Since the present study treated the output and price stabiliza-
tion aspects of automatic fiscal stabilizers separately, no direct 
comparison can be made with the previous work on the effectiveness 
of automatic stabilizers. It may be recalled that the previous studies 
did not consider in their analyses the effect of the changes in the 
price level. However, it may be worthwhile making some general remarks 
about the results of this study and those of the previous ones. For 
the purposes of this sub-section, the results of only those studies are 
discussed which were comprehensive and analyzed the final effect of 
automatic scabilizers on the changes in national income. Thus, the 
studies dealing with the built-in flexibility - the absolute change 
in taxes with respect to a change in national income - of automatic 
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stabilizers are excluded because their results are not comparable. 
The results of Musgrave and Miller (35) study for 1946-1947 
period showed the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers to be 36 per-
cent. Lusher (33) estimated the effectiveness of automatic stabili-
zers during 1953-55 hypothetical recession to be from 36 to 46 percent 
of a change in income. Eilbott (14) concluded that on an average, 
automatic stabilizers were preventing from 36 to 52 percent of a decline 
in income during recessions and from 25 to 42 percent of a rise in 
income during expansions between 1948 and 1960. Rugger 1 s (42) esti-
mate for 1953-63 run from 45 to 49 percent during recessions and 7 to 
41 percent during expansions. The present study revealed that the 
automatic fiscal stabilizers were capable of preventing on an average, 
from 41 to 60 percent of a change in income during expansions and 
from 33 to 44 percent during recessions. 
It can be seen that while almost all the previous studies showed 
that the stabilizers were relatively more effective during recessions 
and less so during expansions, the results of this study led to the 
opposite conclusions. As was expected, this study revealed that the 
stabilizers are relatively more effective during highly inflationary 
expansions and less effective during recessions accompanied with in-
flation. This is so because during the expansions accompanied by rap-
idly rising price level people are moved into the higher income 
brackets and tax collections are greater than what they would be had 
the price level risen normally. Similarly, during recessions when 
output is falling but the price level is still on the rise, the de-
cline in the tax revenues and the increase in transfer payments is 
smaller relative to what it would be had the price level not been 
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going upward. The difference in the results of this study from those 
of the previous ones is, therefore, attributed to the kind of expan-
sions and recessions studied here, which were inflationary. The only 
exception was the case of 1970-73 expansion where the results of this 
study were almost identical to those earlier works. Again, this was 
expected because this expansion had the characteristics of those 
earlier expansions which were not highly inflationary. 
With regard to the individual contribution of the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers, the results of the present study are identical to those 
of Eilbott and Ruggeri who discussed such effects. Personal taxes are 
more effective during expansions while corporate taxes are more impor-
tant stabilizers during recessions, except for 1973-75 period. In spite 
of the fact that the 1973-75 recession was far greater in intensity 
than that of 1969-70, even greater rise in the price level during the 
former checked the decline in corporate taxes. Whereas these taxes de-
clined by $5.19 billion during 1969-70, the decline in corporate taxes 
during 1973-75 period was much less, $1.83 billion. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
As mentioned in Chapter II, some of the transfer payment programs, 
like food stamps, farm price support and aid to families with dependent 
children, were not considered as automatic fiscal stabilizers in this 
study. Such programs have traditionally been excluded from the studies 
of automatic stabilizers. The reason being that their mode of opera-
tion has been such that a great deal of discretion is exercised by 
the authorities concerned in making payments. Therefore, changes in 
the payments made under these programs are not as automatic as is the 
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case with social security and unemployment benefits. However, it may 
as well be worthwhile examining these programs especially the food 
stamp and AFDC, in any further study of automatic fiscal stabilizer 
because there seems to be a trend of standardizing eligibility require-
ments for participation in these programs. This may eventually bring 
them close to the other transfer payment programs which change direc-
tion automatically following a change in economic activity. 
The eligibility requirements for food stamps have been simplified 
lately. For example, the applicant is not required to meet the pur-
chase requirement by putting a minimum amount of cash to buy food 
stamps. Moreover, the food stamp program has become very important 
in recent years, perhaps because more and more people are becoming 
aware and are willing to participate in it. The rise in the general 
price level and especially in the prices of food items may also be 
causing more and more people becoming eligible for food stamps. 
Similarly, Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program is 
moving in the direction where payments may become more automatic in 
nature with the changes in economic activity. Eligibility requirements 
for participation in the AFDC Program have been liberalized. It is 
estimated that by 1971 most of the AFDC families were eligible for 
other in-kind benefits like medicaid and food stamps, etc. The atti-
tudes have changed and the poor are becoming more and more aware of 
their legal rights. For these and other reasons, the composition of 
the families in this program has shifted toward those with living 
fathers. Since 1961, states can provide aid to families with an un-
employed father. If the unemployed parents segment of the program 
becomes important then the payments made under this program may also 
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change with a change in economic activity. The AFDC Program may thus 
become a genuine candidate in the array of automatic stabilizers. 
In view of the above, an in depth study of these programs to 
determine their built-in response may reveal that the economy has more 
built-in stability than has been discovered thus far. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
l. Andersen, P. S. "Built-in Flexibility and Sensitivity of the 
Personal Income Tax in Denmark. 11 Swedish Journal of Econo-
mics, Vol. 75, No. 1 (1973}, pp. 1-17. 
2. Auld, D. A. L. "Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers: Problems of Identi-
fication and Measurement.1 1 Public Finance, Vol. 26 (1971), 
pp. 509-531. 
3. Balopoulos, E. T. Fiscal Policy Models of the British Economy. 
Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1967. 
· 4. Bonnen, J. T. "The Contribution of Farm Price Support Program to 
General Economic Activity. Comment. 11 Policies to Combat 
Depression. Conference of the University National Bureau 
Committee for Economic Research. Princeton University Press, 
1956, pp. 349-354. 
5. Bretherton, R. F. 11 The Sensitivity of Taxes to Fluctuations of 
Trade. 11 Econometrica, Vo 1. 5 ( 1937} , pp. 171-183. 
6. Brown, E. C. "The Static Theory of Automatic Fiscal Stabiliza-
tion." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 63 (October, 1955}, 
pp. 427-440. 
7. Chalmers, J. A. and W. A. Fischel. "An Analysis of Automatic 
Stabilizers in a Small Econometric Model . 11 National Tax 
Journal, Vol. 20 (1967), pp. 432-443. 
8. Clement, M. 0. "The Concept of Automatic Stabilizers.11 Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3 (January, 1959}, pp. 306-
309. 
9. . "The Q'uantitative Impact of Automatic Stabi-
l izers.11 Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLII 
(February, 1960), pp. 56-61. 
10. Cohen, Leo.· 11An Empirical Measurement of the Built-in Flexibility 
of the Individual Income Tax. 11 American Economic Review, 
Vol. 49 (May, 1959}, pp. 532-541. 
11. Committee for Economic Development. Taxes and the Budget: A Pro-
gram for Prosperity in a Free Economy. A Statement on Nation-
al Policy by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee 
for Economic Development. New York (November, 1947), Chap. 1. 
104 
105 
12. Duesenberry, J., 0. Eckstein, and G. Frorrm. 11A Simulation of the 
United States Economy in Recession. 11 Econometrica, Vol. 28 
(October, 1960), pp. 749-809. 
13. Egle, W. P. Economic Stabilization: Objectives, Rules and Mech-
anisms. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 46. 
14. Eilbott, P. "The Effectiveness of Automatic Stabilizers. 11 Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 61 (June, 1966), pp. 450-465. 
15. Eisner, Robert. 11A Permanent Income Theory for Investment: Some 
Empirical Exploration." American Economic Review, Vol. 57 
(June, 1967), pp. 363-390. 
16. . "Capital Expenditures, Profits and the 
Acceleration Principle.'' in Model of Income Determination. 
NBER Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 28, Princeton, 1964, 
pp. 137-165. 
17. Federal Reserve Board. Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1975, 
p. A 35. 
18. Ferber, Robert. 11 Consumer Econom·i cs, A Survey. 11 Journa 1 of 
Economic Li tera tu re. (December, 1973) , pp. 1303-1342. 
19. Fox, Karl A. 11 The Contribution of Farm Price Support Program to 
General Economic Activity. 11 Policies to Combat Depression. 
Conference of the Univ-National Bureau Committee for Economic 
Research. Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 295-349. 
20. Friedman, Milton. 11A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic 
Stability." American Economic Review, XXXVIII (June, 1948), 
pp. 245-264. 
21. . 11 Windfalls, the 'Horizon' and Related Con-
cepts in the Permanent Income Hypothesis. 11 in C. F. Christ 
(Ed.) Measurement in Economics. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1963, p. 23. 
22. Halbrook, Robert and Frank Stafford. 11 The Propensity to Consume 
Separate Types of Income: A Generalized Permanent Income 
Hypothesis."· Econometrica, Vol. 39, No. l (January, 1971), 
pp. 1-21. 
23. Hart, Albert G. Money, Debt and Economic Activity (1st Ed.) 
New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1948, pp. 475-489. 
24. . Money, Debt and Economic Activity (2nd Ed.) 
New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1953, p. 462. 
25. and P. B. Kennen. Money, Debt and Economic 
Activity (3rd Ed.) New York: Prentice Ha 11, Inc., 1961, 
pp. 464-473. 
26. , P. B. Kennen and Alan D. Entine. Money, 
Debt and Economic Activity (4th Ed.) New York: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 1969, pp. 451-460. 
l 06 
27. Heller, Walter W. New Dimensions of Political Economy. New York: 
Norton, 1967, p. 118. 
28. Helliwell, J. and F. Gorbet. 11Assessing the Dynamic Efficiency of 
Automatic Stabilizers. 11 Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
19, No. 4 (August, 1971), pp. 826-845. 
29. Hickman, Bert G. Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy . 
. Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960, pp. 221-
237. 
30. Lester, Richard A. The Economic Significance of Unemployment 
Compensation, 1948-59. 11 Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 42 (November, 1960), pp. 349-372. 
31. Lewis, Wilfred Jr. Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recession. 
Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1969, pp. 25-66. 
32. . 11Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers in the 1957-58 
Business Contraction: A Comment. 11 Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 42, No. 4 (November, 1960), p. 439. 
33. Lusher, David. 11 The Stabilizing Effectiveness of Budget Flexibi-
lity.11 Policies to Combat Depression. Princeton, 1956, 
pp. 77-89. 
34. Maddala, G. S. Econometrics. McGraw Hill Book, Co., 1977, pp. 
338-339. 
35. Musgrave, Richard A. and Merton H. Miller. 11 Built-in Flexibility. 11 
American Economic Review. XXXVIII (March, 1948), pp. 122-128. 
36. Musgrave, Richard A. The Theory of Public Finance. New York, 
1959, pp. 510-511. 
37. and Peggy B. Musgrave. Public Finance in 
Theory and Practice (2nd Ed.) McGraw Hill Book, Co., 
1976, pp. 207, 558. 
38. Packer, A. H. and F. C. Ripley. "The Strength and Target-Seeking 
Characteristics of the Automatic Stabilizers. 11 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 89, pt. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 314-321. 
39. Pearse, P. H. "Automatic Stabilization and the British Taxes on 
Income. 11 Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 29 (February, 1962), 
pp. 1 24-137. 
107 
40. Peckman, Joseph A. 11 Yield of Individual Income Tax Reduction Dur-
ing a Recession. 11 National Tax Journal, VII (March, 1954), 
pp. 1-16. 
41. . 11 Responsiveness of the Federal Individual 
Income Tax to Changes in Income. 11 Brookings Paper on Econo-
mic Activity (1973), pp. 385-421. 
42. Ruggeri, G. C. 11 Automatic Stabilizers, Business Cycles and Econo-
mic Growth. 11 Kyklos, Vol. 26 (1973), pp. 288-306. 
43. Smith, Paul E. 11 Built-in Flexibility of the Individual Income 
Tax: Quarterly Estimates. 11 National Tax Journal, Vol. 15 
(June, 1962), pp. 194-197. 
44. . 11 A Note on the Built-in Flexibility of the 
Individual Income Tax. 11 Econometrica, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Octo-
ber, 1963), pp. 704-711. 
45. Smyth, D. J. "Built-in Flexibility of Taxation and Automatic Sta-
bilization.11 Journal of Political Economy (August, 1966), 
pp. 396-400. 
46. Snowbarger, M. and J. Kirk. "A Cross-sectional Model of Built-in 
Flexibility. 11 National Tax Journal, Vol. 26, pt. 2 (June, 
1963), pp. 241-249. 
47. Social Security and Medicare Explained. Chicago, Ill.: Commer-
cial Clearing House, Inc. 1978, p. 172. 
48. Takahashi, Chotaro. 11 Built-in Stabilizer of Income Tax. 11 Keizai 
Kenkyu, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January, 1963), pp. 1-8 (Japanese}; 
Journal of Economic Abstracts, Vol. 1 (1963), p. 320. 
49. Teeters, Nancy H. "Built-in Flexibility of Federal Expenditures. 11 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity (1971), pp. 615-648. 
50. Thirlwall, A. P. 11 Unemployment Compensation as an Automatic 
Stabilizer." Oxford University Institute of Economics and 
Statistics Bulletin, Vol. 31, pt. l (February, 1969), 
pp. 23-37.· 
51. U. S. Department of Agriculture. Food Stamp Program, A Report in 
Accordance with the Senate Resolution 58. Washington, D.C.: 
Food and Nutrition Service (1977), Chapter 2, pp. l, 10, 53. 
52. U. S. Department of Commerce. Business Conditions Digest. Wash-
ington, D. C.: Bureau of Economic Analysis (January, 1977), 
p. l 06. 
53. . Survey of Current Business. Vol. 47, No. 1 
(January, 1967), p. 1. 
108 
54. U. S. General Accounting Office. GAO Food Stamp Seminar, A Tran-
scri}t of the Proceedings. Washington, D. C. (July 10, 
1975 ' pp. 5-18' 30' 161 . 
55. U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Findings of the 
AFDC Stud , Part 1. Demora hie and Pro ram Characteristics. 
Social and Rehabilitation Service. June, 1974 , pp. 3-9. 
56. Services to the AFDC Families. Third Annual 
Report to the Congress on Services to Families Receiving 
AFDC under Title IV of the Social Security Act, Washington, 
D. C. (October, 1972), pp. 2, 22. 
57. Social Security Bulletin. Washington, 
D. C.: Social Security Administration (December, 1966), 










---=---:---,,,.._,,____,_. Social Security Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: 
Social Security Administration (December, 1975), p. 29. 
u. 
Social Security l:landbook. Washington, D.C.: 
Social Security Administration (February, 1974), p. 128. 
S. Management and Business. The Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 1968. Washington, D. C., p. 97. 
--~-.,__,. ___ . The Budget of the United States Government, 
Fiscal Year 1977, p. 95, 135. 
--------· Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance. 




S. Master Tax Guide, 1977. Chicago, Ill.: Commerce Clearing 
House, Inc., pp. 7-8. 
S. President. Economic Report of the President (February, 
1968)' pp. 147-148. 
Economic Report of the President (February, 
1975), pp. 96-97. 
Furstenburg, G. M. "Stabilization Characteristics of Unemploy-
ment Insurance." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 29, No. 3 (April, 1976), pp. 363-376. 
67. White, Melvin I. "Personal Income Tax Reduction in a Hypothetical 
Contraction." Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
XXXI (February, 1949), pp. 63-68. 
68. Zubinski, A. M. "The Built-in Stability of the Australian System 




Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: OUTPUT AND PRICE STABILIZATION EFFECTS OF THE AUTOMATIC 
FISCAL STABILIZERS DURING THE PERIOD, 1966-1975 
Major Field: Economics 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Quetta, Pakistan, February 1, 1942, the 
son of Mr. and Mrs. Fateh Khan. 
Education: Graduated from D. B. High School, Lawa, Campbellpur, 
Pakistan, in March, 1957; received Bachelor of Arts degree 
from the University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan, in 1968; 
received Master of Arts degree in Economics from the Univer:-. 
sity of Baluchistan, Quetta, Pakistan, in 1972; completed - · 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma 
State University in May, 1979. 
